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This article addresses the flood of litigation washing through United States federal courts on wage-and-hour
group actions and the divergent corresponding district-court rulings. The rapidly growing split in authority
relates to the fact that federal law requires that a group wage action be maintained as an opt-in "collective
action" while state wage laws may be pursued through an opt-out "class action." With little circuit-court
authority on the matter, the parties' arguments and courts' analysis fall all over the map. Despite the myriad of
arguments in support of and in opposition to maintaining a state-law opt-out class action in the same suit as a
federal opt-in collective action, this article posits that the proper view is through the lens of preemption and
that a preemption analysis not only prevents the parties and courts from wasting time and financial resources
litigating the propriety of a state-law class action but protects both absent claimants' federal wage claims and
Congress's intent in requiring an opt-in action.
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INTRODUCTION
Because many state wage laws parallel their federal counterpart,
American wage-and-hour law can end up looking much like a
ventriloquist’s act. In the average ventriloquist’s act, the puppet is
usually the more colorful and flashy of the pair on stage, and the
audience sees the puppet “talking.” Thus, it can be easy to forget that
the ventriloquist is in charge and that in the end, it is the same voice
controlling both mouths. The same is true with wage law in the sense
that when group-based actions are involved, judges and juries see the
flashy and engaging state puppet talking and forget that the federal
ventriloquist controls the show. This Article discusses how federal
wage law preempts parallel state wage laws and demonstrates how
imperative this analysis becomes when group-based actions, such as
class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
are involved.
Congress enacted the primary federal wage law, the Fair Labor
1
Standards Act (“FLSA”), in 1938. It has been amended at various
points, but still, at its foundation protects employees by prescribing
the minimum wages that employers must pay and the maximum
hours that employees may be required to work before receiving
2
overtime compensation. Many states have enacted wage laws, either
statutorily or through the development of each state’s common law,
that may or may not parallel the scheme outlined in the FLSA.
Although there may be substantive differences between the respective
state and federal wage laws, for this Article’s purposes, the primary

1. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000).
2. Id. §§ 202, 206, 207. Congress recently raised the national minimum wage,
which will incrementally reach $7.25 per hour. See Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206).
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difference involves how each body of law allows wage claims to be
pursued in a group action.
Like most claims without a default group-action mechanism, group
actions based on state wage laws are governed by Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, if filed in state court, the state’s
3
applicable version of Rule 23. Rule 23 provides that suits may be
filed as class actions on behalf of putative classes so long as certain
4
prerequisites are met. At a certain point in the case’s progression,
the court provides notice to putative class members, informing them
about the class action and allowing them an opportunity to exclude
5
themselves or “opt-out” of the class. Unless individuals opt-out, the
6
court’s judgment binds all class members.
The FLSA’s group-action mechanism is different. Federal wage
claims cannot be filed as class actions under Rule 23 but must instead
be maintained as collective actions that involve participation on an
7
opt-in-only basis. The FLSA’s group-action mechanism is known as a
8
“collective action” and is provided for in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The
opt-in collective action within the FLSA has not always existed. At its
enactment, the FLSA allowed individuals to sue for violations of its
provisions, including minimum wage and overtime, on behalf of
9
other employees in “representative actions.” However, after the
United States Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in Anderson v. Mount

3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000); see also Lehman v. Legg Mason, Inc., 532 F. Supp.
2d 726, 732–33 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (“Defendants’ arguments would be well-taken if
Plaintiff were attempting to bring a Rule 23 class action to enforce rights under the
FLSA. Such a suit is clearly impermissible and a court would have no choice but to
dismiss a complaint to that effect.”); Ellison v. Autozone Inc., No. C06-07522 MJJ,
2007 WL 2701923, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (citing Kinney Shoe Corp. v.
Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled on other grounds, Hoffman-La Roche
Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)) (“However, this reliance is misplaced
because Kinney merely stands for the proposition that Rule 23 procedures should not
be used to certify an FLSA class. Plaintiff does not attempt to certify an FLSA
collective class under Rule 23, but rather intends to prosecute both under their
respective procedures.”) (citation omitted); Baas v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. C
07-03108 JSW, 2007 WL 2462150, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007) (citing Kinney,
564 F.2d at 859) (noting distinguishability of Kinney’s Rule 23 FLSA class).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see Lehman, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 732 (referring to an FLSA
suit as a “collective action”).
9. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 16(b), 52 Stat.
1060, 1069 (1938) (prior to 1947 amendment) (allowing a suit to be maintained by
an employee on “behalf of himself . . . and other employees similarly situated” or,
alternatively, allowing employees to “designate an agent or representative to
maintain” an action in court on their behalf).
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10

Clemens Pottery Co., Congress amended the FLSA through the Portal11
to-Portal Act of 1947 (“PPA”) and required that an employee must
12
consent in writing prior to participating in the action. In other
words, employees wishing to participate in an FLSA collective action
13
must “opt-in.”
The varying opt-in and opt-out schemes for respective federal and
state wage claims have recently troubled United States federal courts,
especially in situations when the state wage claim parallels the federal
14
claim. Historically, the FLSA’s opt-in mechanism has limited the
size of the FLSA action, with estimates indicating that typically only
between fifteen and thirty percent of potential plaintiff-employees
15
opt-in. As a result, plaintiffs, or perhaps more aptly their counsel,
attempt more and more to dual-file wage lawsuits to include both an
16
FLSA collective action and a Rule 23 state class action. Group-based
wage claims with a state-law component, whether dual-filed or
independent of an FLSA claim, are particularly attractive to plaintiffs’
counsel because they provide an opportunity for much larger
17
recoveries and, consequently, greater attorney’s fees. As such, there
18
has been a “new phenomenon” or “explosion” of such lawsuits.
10. 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (expanding the interpretation of compensable work
under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
11. Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b)).
12. Id. § 5(a).
13. See, e.g., Warner v. Orleans Home Builders, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588
(E.D. Pa. 2008) (contrasting the differences in FLSA collective action and Rule 23
class action procedures); Salazar v. AgriProcessors, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877
(N.D. Iowa 2007); Sjoblom v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:07-cv-0451-bbc, 2007
WL 4560541, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2007); Silverman v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp., No. CV 06-7272 DSF(CTx), 2007 WL 3072274, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007).
14. See, e.g., Sjoblom, 2007 WL 4560541, at *4 (detailing the circuit split over
whether plaintiffs can simultaneously bring FLSA and Rule 23 class actions).
15. Matthew W. Lampe & E. Michael Rossman, Procedural Approaches for
Countering the Dual-Filed FLSA Collective Action and State-Law Wage Class Action, 20 LAB.
LAW. 311, 313 (2005).
16. Id. at 315.
17. See Theodora R. Lee, The Role of Human Resources as an Essential Partner in
Building the Compliance and Ethics Program, in No. B-1661 PRACTICING LAW INST., CORP.
LAW & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 497, 508 (2008) (calling the wage-and-hour
class action the “plaintiff’s attorney’s best friend”); Mark A. Knueve, Dollars, Details
Behind Surge in Wage-and-Hour Class Actions, 22 Emp. Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publ’g) No.
2, at 3 (Aug. 14, 2007) (“[A]s the number of cases has risen, so too has the trend of
these cases being filed as putative class actions or putative collective actions. It is a
relatively new phenomenon, fueled partly by large recoveries.”); Lampe & Rossman,
supra note 15, at 314 (noting possibility of a larger class and larger aggregate
damages with state-law claims, including higher attorney’s fees).
18. Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 459 n.19 (W.D. Pa.
2007); see Knueve, supra note 17 (calling filing of putative class actions “relatively new
phenomenon”); Lampe & Rossman, supra note 15, at 311 (calling large-scale FLSA
actions “the ‘claim du jour’ for the plaintiffs’ bar”).
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Defendant-employers, plaintiff-employees, and courts have all set
forth a variety of arguments regarding whether or not a state-law class
claim should proceed parallel to a FLSA action.19 Despite the varying
approaches used to evaluate dual-filed suits, courts reach only one of
two outcomes. Either (1) the court agrees that the state class claim
cannot appropriately exist in the same suit as a federal collective
action and dismisses the state class claim without prejudice, or (2) the
20
court maintains the state and federal claims together.
Neither
outcome addresses the problems associated with allowing a state-law
class action to proceed, including the elimination of individuals’
21
future FLSA claims and of the FLSA’s effectiveness. Nor does either
22
outcome address that the FLSA preempts parallel state wage claims.
Thus, this Article reviews courts’ recent analysis in evaluating the
propriety of dual-filed wage suits and the limited available outcomes
23
in Part I and then discusses the problems associated with allowing a
state-law wage class action to proceed, either in a dual-filed suit or
24
independently, in Part II. Finally, Part III concludes that most
existing analysis on dual-filed suits is unnecessary because the FLSA
preempts parallel state wage claims and consequently avoids the
25
problems associated with state wage class actions.

19. See infra notes 136–138 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 134–136 and accompanying text (evidencing split between
courts that have dismissed without prejudice parallel state-law claims in FLSA cases
and those which have refused to dismiss such claims). For example, these two
outcomes are evident in the two circuit court opinions on this matter, De Asencio v.
Tyson Foods, Inc. and Lindsay v. Government Employees Insurance Co., which are
highlighted below. Compare De Asencio v. Tyson Foods., Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 312 (3d
Cir. 2003) (determining district court erroneously exercised supplemental
jurisdiction over state Rule 23 claims), with Lindsay v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 448
F.3d 416, 425 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reversing the district court’s refusal to certify a state
Rule 23 class).
21. See infra notes 138–188 and accompanying text (reviewing various ways that
plaintiffs can include state-law claims, either as part of an FLSA suit or on
independent grounds).
22. See infra notes 190–257 and accompanying text (concluding that the FLSA
preempts directly parallel state-law claims but does not preempt state-law provisions
that are more generous than those provided by the FLSA).
23. See infra notes 26–136 and accompanying text (broadly discussing the
differences between Rule 23’s class opt-out and the FLSA’s opt-in procedures).
24. See infra notes 138–188 and accompanying text (reviewing various ways that
plaintiffs can include state-law claims, either as part of an FLSA suit or on
independent grounds).
25. See infra notes 190–257 and accompanying text (concluding that the FLSA
preempts directly parallel state-law claims but does not preempt state-law provisions
that are more generous than those provided by the FLSA).
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BACKGROUND ON DUAL-FILED WAGE CLAIMS
A. FLSA Opt-In Versus Rule 23 Opt-Out

As originally enacted, § 216(b) provided that actions could be
maintained “by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such
employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to
maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly
26
situated.”
There was no opt-in provision. Following the 1946
27
Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co. decision that expanded the
interpretation of wage law, wage suits involving an estimated five
billion dollars in damages were filed in court, many of which were
28
representative actions. According to the House Committee’s Report
on the PPA amendment:
The procedure in these suits follows a general pattern. A
petition is filed under section 16 (b) by one or two employees in
behalf of many others. To this is [sic] attached interrogatories
calling upon the employer to furnish specific information
regarding each employee during the entire period of employment.
The furnishing of this data alone is a tremendous financial burden
29
to the employer.

As such, Congress amended the FLSA with the PPA in 1947,
disallowing representative actions and forbidding an employee’s
participation in a collective action “unless he gives his consent in
writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court
30
in which such action is brought.” The opt-in provision, however,
31
still remains in force.
On the other hand, Rule 23 allows “[o]ne or more members of a
class [to] sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
32
[members].” The rule requires notice to class members, and those
who do not exclude themselves from the class are subject to the

26. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060,
1069 (1947) (prior to 1947 amendment).
27. 328 U.S. 680 (1946). Employees sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act for
compensation for time spent walking to workstations and performing preparatory
tasks outside of official working hours. Id. at 682–83.
28. BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, THE PORTAL TO PORTAL ACT OF 1947: WHAT IT DOES,
HOW IT APPLIES, WHAT IT MEANS 2 (1947).
29. H.R. REP. NO. 80-71 (1947), as reprinted in BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, supra
note 28, at D-3.
30. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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33

court’s judgment, whether favorable or not. Thus arises the optin/opt-out paradox that several courts have recognized as an
inherent incompatibility that “essentially nullif[ies] Congress’s intent
in crafting Section 216(b) and eviscerate[s] the purpose of Section
34
216(b)’s opt-in requirement,” and “circumvent[s] the opt-in
35
requirement.”
B. Recent Divided Authority on Handling Dual-Filed FLSA Collective and
State-Law Class Actions
The impact of including a state-law class in a wage dispute is
significant because it will include, by its very nature, all individuals
36
who meet the class definition and do not opt-out. This body of
individuals can include an extra seventy to eighty-five percent of
37
potential participants. The consequence of the larger class is, of
38
course, a potentially larger adverse judgment. As the class increases
in size with each individual, that individual’s allegedly lost wages are
put at risk. However, the inclusion of a state-law class is also
significant because there may be preclusion issues with regard to the
39
legal claims involved and because it can effectively eliminate the
40
FLSA. As such, defendant-employers frequently seek to eliminate
the state-law class claims, including seeking dismissal, seeking
41
summary judgment, or opposing Rule 23 class certification.
Two United States courts of appeals have addressed the
compatibility between opt-in and opt-out actions within a dual-filed
42
suit, but reached opposite results. In De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
43
court’s certification of a Rule 23 state class. The plaintiff-employees

33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
34. Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
35. Evancho v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. Inc., No. 07-2266 (MLC), 2007 WL 4546100,
at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2007).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
37. See Lampe & Rossman, supra note 15, at 313–14 (noting that opt-in rate of a
typical FLSA collective action is only fifteen to thirty percent of eligible persons).
38. Id. at 314.
39. See infra notes 138–165 and accompanying text (examining the grounds
under which plaintiffs can include parallel state-law claims in an FLSA suit and the
extreme lengths to which plaintiffs’ counsel will go to obtain class certification).
40. See infra notes 166–188 and accompanying text (reviewing various reasons
why the opt-in provision is appropriate and indicating ways by which plaintiffs can
avoid implicating the FLSA).
41. See, e.g., Sjoblom v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:07-cv-0451-bbc, 2007 WL
4560541, at *1, *3–4 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2007) (detailing Defendant’s motion to
dismiss the state-law claim).
42. 342 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2003).
43. Id. at 304, 313.

522

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:515

in De Asencio were current and former employees who had worked or
44
The
were working at Tyson Foods’s chicken-processing facility.
plaintiff-employees sought to recover wages under the FLSA and the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law for those employees’
45
unpaid “donning, doffing, and sanitizing activities.” At issue was
whether the district court properly exercised supplemental
46
jurisdiction over the state-law class claim.
The De Asencio court determined that the district court erroneously
exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim as a result
47
of the opt-in/opt-out distinction in § 216(b) and Rule 23. Indeed, it
48
The De Asencio court
recognized that distinction as “crucial.”
considered the possibility that the state-law class claims would
substantially predominate the federal claim, based on the disparate
sizes of the opt-in and opt-out groups and the nature of the state-law
49
claim. It also recognized that Pennsylvania’s overtime law presented
50
“two novel and complex questions of state law.”
In reaching its
decision, the De Asencio court was concerned with dual-filed cases in
which “a state claim constitutes the real body of [the] case, to which
the federal claim is only an appendage: only where permitting
litigation of all claims in the district court can accurately be described
51
as allowing a federal tail to wag what is in substance a state dog.”
52
Conversely, in Lindsay v. Government Employees Insurance Co. the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
53
the district court’s refusal to certify a state-law Rule 23 class. In
Lindsay, the plaintiff-employees were auto-damage adjusters for
GEICO seeking unpaid overtime pay under the FLSA and the New
54
York Minimum Wage Act. The plaintiffs claimed that GEICO had
55
wrongfully classified them as exempt from overtime laws.
The
district court had denied the plaintiff-employees’ motion for state-law
class certification on the ground that the FLSA’s opt-in mechanism

44. Id. at 304.
45. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
46. Id. at 304.
47. Id. at 312.
48. Id. at 310.
49. Id. at 309–12.
50. Id. at 311.
51. Id. at 309 (quoting Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 789 (3d
Cir. 1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
52. 448 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
53. Id. at 416, 425.
54. Id. at 418.
55. Id.
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precluded it from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
56
individuals’ claims who had not opted in to the FLSA group.
In evaluating the district court’s ruling, the D.C. Circuit first
concluded that the district court’s opinion was based upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a), the provision that provides courts with “mandatory”
supplemental jurisdiction over cases forming “part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,”
rather than 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the provision that allows courts
discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction under certain
57
circumstances. In reversing the district court’s decision, the D.C.
Circuit emphasized that the district court “remain[ed] free to
consider whether it ‘may decline to exercise’ supplemental
58
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).” The Lindsay court directed
the district court on remand to examine whether the state-law claims
presented “exceptional circumstances” and whether there existed
59
“other compelling reasons” to decline supplemental jurisdiction.
However, the court specifically instructed that the district court could
not conclude that § 216(b)’s opt-in provision divested the court of
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) because it did not see the
difference between § 216(b) and Rule 23 as “fitting the ‘exceptional
circumstances’/‘other compelling reasons’ language” of that
60
provision.
Since De Asencio and Lindsay, district courts across the country have
likewise split in deciding, both in outcome and reasoning, what
difference § 216(b)’s opt-in provision and Rule 23’s opt-out provision
61
makes. Recently, courts have issued inconsistent rulings on a weekly
62
basis or better. In looking at the issue of whether a state class-based
56. Id.
57. Id. at 420–21 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c) (2000)).
58. Id. at 424 (quoting § 1367(c)).
59. Id. at 425 (quoting § 1367(c)(4)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. (quoting § 1367(c)(4)).
61. See infra notes 62–133 and accompanying text (using a hypothetical case to
explore the different ways in which federal courts have analyzed the propriety of
dual-filed wage claims).
62. See, e.g., Helderman v. Renee’s Trucking, No. 08-cv-141-JPG, 2008 WL
2229762 (S.D. Ill. May 29, 2008); Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Wineland v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 915 (S.D.
Iowa 2008); Osby v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 07-cv-06085-NKL, 2008 WL 2074102 (W.D.
Mo. May 14, 2008); Warner v. Orleans Home Builders, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 583
(E.D. Pa. 2008); Kuhl v. Guitar Ctr. Stores, Inc., No. 07 C 214, 2008 WL 656049 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 5, 2008); Guzman v. VLM, Inc., No. 07-CV-1126 (JG)(RER), 2008 WL 597186
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2008); Di Nardo v. Ned Stevens Gutter Cleaning & Installation,
Inc., No. 07-5529 (SRC), 2008 WL 565765 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2008); Jackson v.
Alpharma Inc., Civ. No. 07-3250 (GEB), 2008 WL 508664 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2008);
Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Thorpe v. Abbott
Labs., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Evancho v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S.
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wage claim may proceed in the same action as a federal collective
wage claim, courts have considered everything from when to properly
evaluate the propriety of the state claim to whether such claims can
63
be settled on a class basis.
The hypothetical dual-filed case: Edwards v. ABC Corporation
In examining the “explosion” of recent decisions considering the
64
propriety of dual-filed wage claims, a hypothetical dual-filed claim is
helpful to elucidate the differing approaches federal courts have
65
taken in reviewing these actions. In Edwards v. ABC Corp., a purely
hypothetical action used for illustrative purposes only, a group of
current and former ABC employees sue the company in federal
district court for alleged violations of state and federal overtimecompensation laws.
The Edwards complaint alleges that
approximately 1500 current and former employees were affected by
ABC’s wage-payment practices. At its commencement, ten plaintiffemployees are named in the suit. State wage law in the Edwards case’s
jurisdiction parallels the FLSA, providing the same minimum-wage
rate and maximum workweek, but state law provides for a four-year
statute of limitations rather than the FLSA’s two- or three-year statute
66
of limitations.
1.

Inc., No. 07-2266 (MLC), 2007 WL 4546100 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2007); Sjoblom v.
Charter Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:07-cv-0451-bbc, 2007 WL 4560541 (W.D. Wis. Dec.
19, 2007); Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439 (W.D. Pa. 2007);
Freeman v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., No. 07-1503 (JLL), 2007 WL 4440875 (D.N.J.
Dec. 18, 2007).
63. See, e.g., Damassia, 250 F.R.D. at 154, 161–64 (granting motion to certify class
after defendant-employer’s attack on state-law class claim under superiority element
of Rule 23); Warner, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion on
incompatibility of opt-in and opt-out mechanisms as well as declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law class claims); Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 442,
452 (dismissing plaintiff-employees’ parallel state class claims despite parties’
settlement and joint motion to approve settlement on Rule 23 state-law class); Riddle
v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., No. 05 C 5880, 2007 WL 2746597, at *1, *3, *4 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 13, 2007) (upholding magistrate judge’s report and recommendation denying
state-law class certification, including on incompatibility and supplemental
jurisdiction grounds associated with Rule 23); Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.,
No. 2:05-CV-0605-RCJ-LRL, 2007 WL 2429149, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2007)
(granting motion for judgment on the pleadings).
64. See Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 459 n.19 (describing “[t]he ‘explosion’ of hybrid
lawsuits involving both state and FLSA claims” as a “recent phenomenon”); Knueve,
supra note 17, at 3 (calling the filing of putative class actions a “relatively new
phenomenon”); Lampe & Rossman, supra note 15, at 311 (calling large-scale FLSA
actions “the ‘claim du jour’ for the plaintiffs’ bar”).
65. The fictional lead plaintiff is named for Linda H. Edwards, whose idea it was
to demonstrate how a dual-filed case might proceed through a hypothetical.
Although this author litigated dual-filed wage claims during her legal practice,
Edwards is not intended to, nor does it, resemble any actual cases.
66. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2000). A two-year statute of
limitations governs claims for unpaid minimum wage or overtime compensation
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The Edwards plaintiff-employees commence their action in a
jurisdiction that had not previously addressed the propriety of a dualfiled lawsuit containing a state-law wage claim that paralleled the
FLSA. Thus, the court will look at De Asencio, Lindsay, and a sample of
67
the numerous recently decided district court cases in evaluating
whether the plaintiff-employees’ state-law class claims may proceed
with their FLSA claim.
a.

The progressing Edwards case: ABC’s pre-discovery motion to
dismiss

In response to the Edwards complaint, ABC files a motion to
dismiss the state-law class claims on numerous bases. Procedurally,
ABC argues that the court should dismiss the plaintiff-employees’
state-law class claims pursuant to:
(1) Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming
that the state-law class claim failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted;
(2) Rule 12(b)(1), claiming that the court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim;
(3) Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings;
(4) Rule 12(f) to strike the state-law class allegations; and,
68
(5) Rule 23 for failure to establish class-action prerequisites.

under the FLSA, but if the violation is “willful,” the limitations period is three years.
Id.
67. See, e.g., Gardner v. W. Beef Props., Inc., No. 07-CV-2345, 2008 WL 2446681
(E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2008); Helderman, 2008 WL 2229762; Damassia, 250 F.R.D. 152;
Wineland, 554 F. Supp. 2d 915; Osby, 2008 WL 2074102; Warner, 550 F. Supp. 2d 583;
Kuhl, 2008 WL 656049; Guzman, 2008 WL 597186; Di Nardo, 2008 WL 565765; Jackson,
2008 WL 508664; Woodard, 250 F.R.D. 178; Thorpe, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1120; Evancho,
2007 WL 4546100; Sjoblom, 2007 WL 4560541; Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d 439; Freeman,
2007 WL 4440875; Salazar v. AgriProcessors, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 873 (N.D. Iowa
2007); Lehman v. Legg Mason, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 726 (M.D. Pa. 2007); Ellison v.
Autozone Inc., No. C06-07522 MJJ, 2007 WL 2701923 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007);
Riddle, 2007 WL 2746597; Baas v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. C 07-03108 JSW, 2007
WL 2462150 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007); Brickey v. Dolencorp, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 176
(W.D.N.Y. 2007); Marquez v. Partylite Worldwide, Inc., No. 07 C 2024, 2007 WL
2461667 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007); Williams, 2007 WL 2429149; Ramsey v. Ryan Beck
& Co., No. 07-635, 2007 WL 2234567 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007); Bamonte v. City of
Mesa, No. CV 06-01860-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 2022011 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2007).
68. See, e.g., Helderman, 2008 WL 2229762, at *3 (motion to dismiss or strike);
Wineland, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 917 (motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)); Osby, 2008
WL 2074102, at *1 (motion for judgment on the pleadings or to strike); Warner, 550
F. Supp. 2d at 584 (motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)); Kuhl, 2008 WL 656049,
at *1 (motion to dismiss); Woodard, 250 F.R.D. at 179 (motion to strike pursuant to
Rule 12(f) and Rule 23(d)); Thorpe, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (motion to dismiss or
strike); Sjoblom, 2007 WL 4560541, at *1 (motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
motion to strike under Rule 12(f), and Rule 23(d)(4) motion).
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ABC provides these Rules as alternative bases for dismissal because
courts have divided on the proper procedural approach for handling
69
dismissal of the state-law class claim. For example, some courts have
agreed that dismissal is appropriate on a motion to dismiss or similar
70
71
prediscovery motion. In Warner v. Orleans Home Builders, Inc., the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted
the defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) on the basis that the opt-in and opt-out provisions were
incompatible and further declined to exercise supplemental
72
jurisdiction. Other courts have refused to rule on the propriety of
state-law class claims on a motion to dismiss or similar motion,
reserving ruling on the matter until the proceedings have progressed
73
Still other courts have refused to dismiss state-law class
further.

69. See, e.g., Helderman, 2008 WL 2229762, at *3 (determining dismissal
premature on motion to dismiss and reserving ruling for further development); Osby,
2008 WL 2074102, at *3 (same); Warner, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (granting Rule
12(b)(6) motion on incompatibility of opt-in and opt-out mechanisms as well as
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law class claims); Kuhl,
2008 WL 656049, at *4 (determining dismissal premature on motion to dismiss and
reserving ruling for further development); Woodard, 250 F.R.D. at 182–83 (granting
motion to strike state-law class claims on numerous bases); Thorpe, 534 F. Supp. 2d at
1122, 1124 (refusing to dismiss state-law class claims on a motion to dismiss); Sjoblom,
2007 WL 4560541, at *1 (same); Freeman, 2007 WL 4440875, at *3 (determining
dismissal premature on motion to dismiss and reserving ruling for further
development); Salazar, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 885 (refusing to dismiss state-law class
claims on a motion to dismiss); Lehman, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 732 (determining
dismissal premature on motion to dismiss and reserving ruling for further
development); Ellison, 2007 WL 2701923, at *2 (same); Baas, 2007 WL 2462150, at *1
(refusing to dismiss state-law class claims on a motion to dismiss); Williams, 2007 WL
2429149, at *1 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings); Ramsey, WL 2007
2234567, at *4 (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion on incompatibility and supplemental
jurisdiction).
70. See, e.g., Warner, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion on
incompatibility of opt-in and opt-out mechanisms as well as declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law class claims); Woodard, 250 F.R.D. at 182–83
(granting motion to strike state-law class claims on numerous bases); Williams, 2007
WL 2429149, at *1 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings); Ramsey, 2007
WL 2234567, at *4 (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion on incompatibility and
supplemental jurisdiction).
71. 550 F. Supp. 2d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
72. Id. at 587.
73. See, e.g., Helderman, 2008 WL 2229762, at *3 (determining dismissal
premature on motion to dismiss and reserving ruling for further development); Osby,
2008 WL 2074102, at *3 (determining dismissal premature on motion to dismiss and
reserving ruling for further development); Kuhl, 2008 WL 656049, at *4
(determining dismissal premature on motion to dismiss and reserving ruling for
further development); Freeman, 2007 WL 4440875, at *3 (determining dismissal
premature on motion to dismiss and reserving ruling for further development);
Lehman, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 732 (determining dismissal premature on motion to
dismiss and reserving ruling for further development); Ellison, 2007 WL 2701923, at
*2 (determining dismissal premature on motion to dismiss and reserving ruling for
further development).
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claims outrightly on a motion to dismiss rather than saving the matter
74
for a later date.
Substantively, ABC focuses its arguments on Congress’s
75
amendment of the FLSA to require an opt-in group action and the
inherent incompatibility between the opt-in and opt-out mechanisms
for respective federal and state claims. ABC also argues that the court
should decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss the state-law
class claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because the state-law class
claims predominate the federal claim.
In existing case law on the matter, many defendant-employers have
argued, and some courts have agreed, that a state-law class cannot
coexist with a § 216(b) collective action based on the inherent
incompatibility of the two mechanisms. These cases look generally at
76
dismissals under Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c), or 12(f). For example, in
Warner, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the state-law
class claim in the plaintiff-employees’ complaint based on the FLSA
collective action’s incompatibility with the Rule 23 state-law class
77
action. The court determined that “allowing the two types of actions
to proceed in federal court in single suit would undermine
78
Congress’s intent in implementing an opt-in requirement.”
The
Western District of Pennsylvania has also determined that allowing
the two groups to proceed simultaneously would “circumvent the
[FLSA] opt-in requirement” and “essentially nullify Congress’s intent
in crafting Section 216(b) and eviscerate the purpose of Section
79
216(b)’s opt-in requirement.”
Other courts have agreed, thus
80
severing state-law class claims based on incompatibility alone.
74. See, e.g., Thorpe, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1122, 1124 (refusing to dismiss state-law
class claims on a motion to dismiss); Sjoblom, 2007 WL 4560541, at *1 (refusing to
dismiss state-law class claims on a motion to dismiss); Salazar, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 885
(refusing to dismiss state-law class claims on a motion to dismiss); Baas, 2007 WL
2462150, at *4 (refusing to dismiss state-law class claims on a motion to dismiss).
75. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the opt-in provision
added to the FLSA by the Portal-to-Portal Act).
76. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the various independent
grounds under Rule 12 by which ABC would move to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims in
the hypothetical Edwards case).
77. Warner v. Orleans Home Builders, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 583, 587 (E.D. Pa.
2008).
78. Id. at 588.
79. Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 451–52 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(quoting Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524 (M.D. Pa. 2006))
(internal quotations omitted).
80. See, e.g., Evancho v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. Inc., No. 07-2266 (MLC), 2007 WL
4546100, at *1, *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2007) (granting motion to strike on basis that
state-law class circumvented § 216(b) opt-in provision and undermined Congress’s
intent in enacting the PPA); Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-0605RCJ-LRL, 2007 WL 2429149, at *1, *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2007) (granting motion for
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81

Indeed, the court in Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co. determined that
82
this was neither an “unusual” nor a “new” result.
Meanwhile, still other courts have determined that inherent
incompatibility does not eliminate state-law class claims, either at all
or as the sole reason for dismissal. For example, numerous courts,
even subsequent to cases determining that dismissal through a Rule
83
12(b)(6) motion was proper on inherent incompatibility alone, have
determined that there is no legal doctrine that allows state-law class
claims to be dismissed on the basis of inherent compatibility alone
84
and that the analysis must include something more. Likewise, some
courts have simply rejected defendant-employers’ arguments and
85
determined that § 216(b) and Rule 23 actions may properly coexist.
Although the Edwards court could rely on the authorities stating
that inherent compatibility is not itself a doctrine justifying dismissal
and thus deny ABC’s motion to dismiss as it pertains to dismissal
86
based “solely” on inherent incompatibility, the compatibility analysis
does not end with Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c), or 12(f). Whether the optin and opt-out mechanisms are inherently incompatible is also
relevant to ABC’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and
whether the court should decline to exercise supplemental
judgment on the pleadings because state-law class would thwart PPA amendment’s
purposes by permitting plaintiffs to “back door the shoehorning in” of additional
plaintiffs absent opting in (quoting Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D.
462, 470 (N.D. Cal. 2004)); Ramsey v. Ryan Beck & Co., No. 07-635, 2007 WL
2234567, at *1, *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion on basis
of incompatibility).
81. 527 F. Supp. 2d 439 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
82. Id. at 448–49 (citations omitted).
83. See, e.g., Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-0605-RCJ-LRL, 2007
WL 2429149, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2007) ("[This] Court follows the latter line of
cases and finds that the class action mechanisms of the FLSA and Rule 23 are
incompatible."); Ramsey v. Ryan Beck & Co., No. 07-635, 2007 WL 2234567, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007) (finding the district court erred in not dismissing the statelaw claims because the claims touched on “novel and complex questions of state law”
in addition to inherent compatibility reasons).
84. See, e.g., Gardner v. W. Beef Props., Inc., No. 07-CV-2345, 2008 WL 2446681,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2008) (stating that “‘inherent incompatibility,’ standing
alone, is not a ‘doctrine’ or rule of law” that requires dismissal of state-law class
claims) (quoting Westerfield v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 06-CV-2817, 2007 WL 2162989,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2007); Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 162
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (determining no legal doctrine allowed dismissal on the basis on
incompatibility alone); Salazar v. AgriProcessors, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 873, 879 (N.D.
Iowa 2007) (same).
85. See, e.g., Sjoblom v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:07-cv-0451-bbc, 2007 WL
4560541, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2007) (finding state-law claims compatible with
federal collective-action claims and denying motion to dismiss); Lehman v. Legg
Mason, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 726, 731 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (same).
86. See supra note 84 (citing cases that support the proposition that
incompatibility between an FLSA § 216(b) collective action and a Rule 23 state-law
wage claim does not justify dismissal).
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jurisdiction over the state-law class claims. Because the federal
collective action is founded on the FLSA, a federal court has
jurisdiction over such claims by virtue of federal question
87
A court with federal question jurisdiction may also
jurisdiction.
have supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims, assuming
the claims are based upon “the same case or controversy,” meaning
88
that they derive from a common nucleus of fact.
Even if a court has supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims,
it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under certain
89
circumstances.
Those circumstances are outlined in 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) and include the presence of (1) “novel or complex” state-law
claims,
(2) state-law claims that “substantially predominate[]” over the
federal-law claims, (3) a dismissal of all claims over which the court
had original jurisdiction, or (4) another “compelling reason[] for
90
In terms of the inherent-incompatibility
declining jurisdiction.”
issue, courts have split on whether the tension between Congress’s
intent in requiring an opt-in action for federal wage claims and the
availability of a Rule 23 opt-out class action on state wage law
constitutes a “compelling reason” to decline jurisdiction in itself.
Some courts have determined that none of the circumstances in
91
§ 1367(c) existed and therefore exercised supplemental jurisdiction.

87. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); see also Kuhl v. Guitar Ctr. Stores, Inc., No. 07 C 214,
2008 WL 656049, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2008) (noting federal question jurisdiction
over FLSA claim); Ellison v. Autozone Inc., No. C06-07522 MJJ, 2007 WL 2701923, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (same).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000); see, e.g., Kuhl, 2008 WL 656049, at *4 (discussing
the legal standard for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffemployees’ state-law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)).
89. § 1367(c).
90. Id. As noted above, the supplemental jurisdiction analysis was a key issue in
Lindsay, the District of Columbia Circuit case on this issue. Lindsay v. Gov’t
Employees Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 420–21 (D.C. Cir. 2006). However, the D.C.
Circuit determined in its analysis that the district court had not based its holding on
any of the reasons to decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c). Id.
(quoting § 1367(a)). Instead, the D.C. Circuit determined that the district court’s
holding had been limited to mandatory jurisdiction under § 1367(a). Lindsay, 448
F.3d at 420–21 (quoting § 1367(c)).
91. See, e.g., Salazar v. AgriProcessors, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 873, 884–85 (N.D.
Iowa 2007) (determining that state-law claims were not novel or complex and did not
present different terms of proof and that the PPA amendment did not constitute a
compelling reason to decline jurisdiction); Brickey v. Dolencorp, Inc., 244 F.R.D.
176, 178–79 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (refusing to decline supplemental jurisdiction because
the existence of four states’ laws did not allow the state–law claims to substantially
predominate and because there were no other compelling reasons to decline
jurisdiction); Bamonte v. City of Mesa, No. CV 06-01860-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL
2022011, at *3-5 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2007) (determining that state-law claims did not
predominate as a result of the identical nature of the state and federal claims, that
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Other courts have determined that the inherent incompatibility
between the opt-in and opt-out mechanisms was itself a compelling
92
reason to decline jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(4). Still other
courts have looked at the state laws specifically and determined either
that they presented novel or complex issues of state law that
93
warranted dismissal or substantially predominated the federal claims
94
pleaded.
In addition to outright dismissal under Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c),
and/or 12(f), and dismissal related to supplemental jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1), inherent incompatibility is also relevant to
ABC’s motion to dismiss in the Edwards case under Rule 23.
Although defendant-employers have disputed plaintiff-employees’
ability to establish many or all of the prerequisites and other elements
of a class action under Rule 23, inherent-incompatibility is often part
of an attack on whether the “class action is superior to other available
95
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”
In these situations, the “other available method” is, of course, the
FLSA collective action.
Courts have also reached mixed results on this issue. For example,
96
in Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York analyzed whether the plaintiffemployees could establish each element of a class action under Rule
23, including whether it was superior to a collective action under the

the number of opt-out claims was not dispositive, and that other values were met by
exercising jurisdiction).
92. See, e.g., Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178, 182 (M.D. Pa.
2008) (concluding that incompatibility between opt-in and opt-out mechanisms was
compelling reason to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4)).
93. See, e.g., Warner v. Orleans Home Builders, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 583, 590
(E.D. Pa. 2008) (deciding that state-law claims were “novel and complex” and were
thus “better left to the Pennsylvania state courts”) (quoting De Asencio v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 2003); Ramsey v. Ryan Beck & Co., No. 07635, 2007 WL 2234567, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007) (same).
94. See, e.g., Warner, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 589 (determining that the terms of proof
underlying the state-law claims made them substantially predominant); Ramsey, 2007
WL 2234567, at *4 (noting that state-law claims were broader in scope and presented
different remedies, making them substantially predominant).
95. See, e.g., Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 161–64 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (addressing superiority issue at state-law class certification stage); Ellison v.
Autozone Inc., No. C06-07522 MJJ, 2007 WL 2701923, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13,
2007) (addressing superiority on Rule 12(f) motion to strike and determining
examination premature at that stage); Riddle v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., No. 05 C
5880, 2007 WL 2746597, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2007) (same); Marquez v.
Partylite Worldwide, Inc., No. 07 C 2024, 2007 WL 2461667, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27,
2007) (same, except also noting that “any class that does not follow the procedures
set forth in § 216(b) of the FLSA is not likely to meet Rule 23’s superiority
requirement”).
96. 250 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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97

In determining the superiority issue, the Damassia court
FLSA.
incorporated the same lines of analysis as those discussed above,
including inherent incompatibility; substantial predominance and
supplemental jurisdiction; and judicial economy, fairness,
98
convenience, and comity. The court determined that none of these
issues indicated that the federal collective action was superior and
that a class action provided “a more cost-efficient and fair litigation of
99
common disputes.”
100
In Riddle v. National Security Agency, Inc., the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois also used inherent
incompatibility and elements of supplemental jurisdiction to
determine whether an FLSA collective action was superior to a Rule
101
23 state-law class action.
However, the Riddle court, in applying
similar elements of analysis, reached a conclusion that opposed the
Damassia court’s view of whether a state class was superior to a federal
102
In Riddle, the court determined that a Rule 23
collective action.
class action was not superior because creating such a state-law class
would thwart Congress’s goals in enacting § 216(b)’s opt-in
103
Likewise, the court emphasized (despite explicitly
requirement.
declining to analyze supplemental jurisdiction) that the size disparity
between a potential opt-out class and an opt-in collective action
would put the court in “the rather incongruous situation of an FLSA
‘class’ including only a tiny number of employees who are interested
in seeking back wages, with a state-law class that nonetheless includes
104
all or nearly all of the companies’” current or former employees.
97. See id. at 155–64 (discussing the “rigorous analysis” that the court must
perform in order to judge whether Rule 23’s requirements are satisfied, and listing
those requirements as numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance,
and superiority). Although Damassia and Riddle involved motions to certify state-law
classes, the analysis is still relevant to ABC’s motion to dismiss in the Edwards case.
Parties have also disputed the superiority of a class action over an FLSA collective
action in a prediscovery motion, such as a motion to strike. See Ellison, 2007 WL
2701923, at *1 (considering the defendant’s reasons for moving to strike the
plaintiff’s state-law claims, but nevertheless denying the motion); Marquez, 2007 WL
2461667, at *1 (explaining that the defendant was moving to strike the plaintiff’s
state-law claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f)).
98. Damassia, 250 F.R.D. at 161–64.
99. Id. at 164.
100. No. 05 C 5880, 2007 WL 2746597, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2007)
101. Id. at *3 (emphasizing Congress’s choice to amend FLSA and add an opt-in
provision, and recognizing that establishing a Rule 23 class would conflict with
Congress’s intent).
102. Id. at *4 (overruling the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in all aspects
except its FLSA minimum wage claim).
103. See id. at *3 (validating the magistrate judge’s preoccupation with combining
a state class and a federal collective action).
104. Id. at *9 n.3, *10 (quoting Muecke v. A-Reliable Auto Parts & Wreckers, Inc.,
No. 01 C 2361, 2002 WL 1359411, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2002)).
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The court determined, therefore, that certifying a state-law class
“would effectively allow[] a federal tail to wag what is in substance a
105
Thus, the court adopted the magistrate judge’s report
state dog.”
and recommendation denying the plaintiff-employees’ motion for
Rule 23 class certification on the basis that the Rule 23 class action
106
was not superior to an FLSA collective action.
The final theory ABC advances in support of its motion to dismiss
107
in the Edwards case involves the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”). The
REA provides that the “Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of
evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of
108
appeals.” However, those rules may not “abridge, enlarge or modify
109
any substantive right.” The substance/procedure distinction—that
determines whether a Supreme Court rule abridges, enlarges, or
modifies a substantive right, thus making that rule invalid—has been
raised as an issue in dual-filed FLSA collective and state-law Rule 23
110
class actions.
ABC would argue, for example, that in Ellis, the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the
substance/procedure distinction and determined that rights
111
provided in the PPA amendment are “clearly substantive rights,”
including an employer’s right to be free from “the burden of
112
representative actions” and an employee’s right to have his or her
FLSA claims included in a collective action “only with his or her

105. Id. at *10 (quoting McClain v. Leona’s Pizzeria, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 574, 577
(N.D. Ill. 2004)) (alteration in original).
106. Id. at *1. Other courts have suggested that plaintiff-employees will not likely
be able to meet Rule 23’s superiority requirement as the cases progress, despite
denying defendant-employers’ Rule 12(f) motions to strike. See Ellison v. Autozone
Inc., No. C06-07522 MJJ, 2007 WL 2701923, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (“While
[d]efendant may ultimately be able to demonstrate that having concurrent opt-in
and opt-out proceedings is unworkable or would unduly confuse potential plaintiffs,
this is a fact-specific and case management issue that the Court finds inappropriate
to resolve at the Rule 12(f) stage.”); Marquez v. Partylite Worldwide, Inc., No. 07 C
2024, 2007 WL 2461667, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007) (“[G]iven the history of the
FLSA and Rule 23, any class that does not follow the procedures set forth in § 216(b)
of the FLSA is not likely to meet Rule 23’s superiority requirement.”).
107. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
108. Id. § 2072(a).
109. Id. § 2072(b).
110. See infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text.
111. Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
112. Id. at 457 (quoting Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173
(1989)).
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113

express written consent.” The court highlighted the “perfunctory”
nature of existing cases’ analysis of the REA issue and determined
that the REA forbade “[t]he use of Rule 23 to create a combined opt114
The Edwards plaintiff-employees, however,
in/opt-out action.”
would rebut by showing that other courts, both prior and subsequent
to the court’s decision in Ellis, have rejected the REA argument out of
115
hand.
As described above, the court evaluating ABC’s motion to dismiss
in Edwards would be able to support its position with precedent
whether it grants or denies the motion. In order to continue the
analysis for purposes of this Article, let us assume that the court in
Edwards denies ABC’s motion in all respects but specifically
determines that these issues are simply prematurely raised in a
116
motion to dismiss.
As such, ABC would be free to attack each of
these issues at later stages during the litigation.

113. Id. at 454–55 (quoting Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants at *18, Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345
(4th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-1259), available at 2006 WL 1911678. Again, although the
context in Ellis was the court’s refusal to certify a state-law class after the parties’
mutual settlement and joint motion to certify the class rather than on a motion to
dismiss, defendant-employers have also raised the REA issue in prediscovery motions
to dismiss. See Osby v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 07-cv-06085-NKL, 2008 WL 2074102, at *1,
*4 (W.D. Mo. May 14, 2008) (denying defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings and motion to strike Rule 23 allegations); Sjoblom v. Charter Commc’ns,
LLC, No. 3:07-cv-0451-bbc, 2007 WL 4560541, at *1, *5 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2007)
(denying defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s state-law class claims); Lehman v.
Legg Mason, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 726, 728, 732 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (addressing
defendants’ motions to dismiss).
114. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 456–57.
115. See Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(claiming that the REA does not block the certification of a state class); Osby, 2008
WL 2074102, at *4 (declaring that no rights are altered by having federal collective
class actions and state-law classes coincide); Sjoblom, 2007 WL 4560541, at *5
(concluding that the FLSA does not preempt Wisconsin state law); Lehman, 532 F.
Supp. 2d at 732 (distinguishing from precedent that rejected dual-filed claims).
116. A ruling that the various issues have been prematurely raised in a motion to
dismiss and that the defendant-employer may dispute the same matters at a later
stage is consistent with many decisions on the dual-filing issue. See Helderman v.
Renee’s Trucking, No. 08-cv-141-JPG, 2008 WL 2229762, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 29, 2008)
(citing the need for additional findings of fact); Osby, 2008 WL 2074102, at *3
(delaying the dismissal because there is no evidence to suggest that adjudicating the
federal and state-law claims together would be unfair); Kuhl v. Guitar Ctr. Stores,
Inc., No. 07 C 214, 2008 WL 656049, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2008) (noting that, at
this point in the proceedings, the court only has the power to decide whether it can
hear the state and federal law claims); Freeman v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., No. 071503 (JLL), 2007 WL 4440875, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2007) (explaining that since
discovery and a motion for certification had not occurred yet, it was too early to
examine the federal and state issues in the action); Lehman, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 732
(articulating that defendant’s arguments against plaintiff’s “eventual” motion for
class certification were too “speculative” at this point); Ellison v. Autozone Inc., No.
C06-07522 MJJ, 2007 WL 2701923, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (ruling that the
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The progressing Edwards case: Attacking state-law certification

Because the judge in Edwards determines that ABC’s arguments on
the propriety of including a state-law class action with the plaintiffemployees’ FLSA collective action are premature, ABC is free to raise
the same issues at the next available stage. In many cases, defendantemployers next attack Rule 23 state classes in opposition to the
117
plaintiff-employees’ motion to certify the state-law class.
While
FLSA preliminary collective-action certification and notice are often
sought early in litigation, the Rule 23 class-certification motion often
comes late, after the plaintiffs have had an opportunity to establish
118
Rule 23’s prerequisites through discovery. At the class-certification
stage, ABC argues that the court in Edwards should not certify a statelaw class under Rule 23 for the same reasons ABC moved to dismiss
the state-law class claims: inherent incompatibility, supplemental
jurisdiction, the REA, and a failure to establish each of Rule 23’s
prerequisites to class certification. The legal analysis is largely the
same, except that it follows discovery on the state-law claims.
Throughout discovery, ABC produced perhaps tens of thousands of
documents, including payroll and other documents spanning four
years prior to the case’s commencement (the state-law limitations
period) and pertaining to all 1500 potential class members.
Because the Edwards case has progressed through discovery, ABC’s
argument as to whether the state-law claim substantially predominates
the federal-law claim has developed significantly. Since the case’s
commencement, only 225 individuals have opted in to the FLSA
collective action, which amounts to fifteen percent of the estimated
1500 possible collective-action members. In looking at substantial
predomination only from the perspective of class versus collective
action size, precedent guides the Edwards court in a number of
directions.

decision was premature, particularly because the court had independent jurisdiction
over these claims under CAFA).
117. See, e.g., Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 319
F.3d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the defendants opposed the plaintiff’s
Rule 23 motion for class certification and arguing that the plaintiff had not satisfied
its requirements).
118. See Noah H. Finkel, The Fair Labor Standards Act, State Wage-and-Hour Law Class
Actions: The Real Wave of “FLSA” Litigation?, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 159, 176
(2003) (stating that “plaintiffs’ counsel often asks for permission to send a FLSA optin notice to potential class members very early in a case” and that they “often will
move for class certification at a slightly later stage in the case, possibly because the
more difficult burden of showing the necessity of class certification under Rule 23
than under section 16(b) can require extensive discovery and briefing”).

2009]

FEDERAL TAILS AND STATE PUPPY DOGS

535

For example, in De Asencio, the size of the opt-in group in
comparison to the size of the opt-out class action was a significant
119
factor in the supplemental-jurisdiction analysis. The Third Circuit
recognized that the two groups contained 447 FLSA opt-in members
120
and 4100 possible state-law opt-out class members. In analyzing the
matter, the De Asencio court noted that “aggregation of claims,
particularly as class actions . . . affects the dynamics for discovery,
trial, negotiation and settlement, and can bring hydraulic pressure to
121
The court reasoned that the disparity
bear on defendants.”
between the FLSA group and the state-law class could be “dispositive
by transforming the action to a substantial degree, by causing the
federal tail represented by a comparatively small number of plaintiffs
122
to wag what is in substance a state dog.”
The Third Circuit
determined, “[h]ere, the inordinate size of the state-law class, the
different terms of proof required by the implied contract state-law
claim, and the general federal interest in opt-in wage actions suggest
the federal action is an appendage to the more comprehensive state
123
On the other hand, despite the language in De Asencio
action.”
suggesting that the differing size of the classes could be dispositive,
other courts have determined that substantial predominance relates
124
to “the type of claim, not the number of claimants.”
Again, for purposes of advancing the analysis, let us assume that
the Edwards court grants the plaintiff-employees’ motion to certify the
state-law class.
c.

The progressing Edwards case: Towards settlement

Within a short period of time following the court’s certification of
the state-law class in Edwards, the parties engage in settlement talks.
Perhaps the Edwards court is in a jurisdiction that requires a pretrial
settlement conference or other attempt at alternative dispute
125
resolution. Or, perhaps the parties voluntarily engage in mediation
or another type of alternative dispute resolution. In either case, let
us assume that the parties mutually resolve the matter entirely. They
execute a settlement agreement, which provides that all claims
119. See De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 310–12 (3d Cir. 2003)
(articulating multiple reasons for why the size of a class is important).
120. Id. at 305.
121. Id. at 310.
122. Id. at 311.
123. Id. at 312.
124. Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing
Lindsay v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 425 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
125. See, e.g., D. MINN. R. 16.5(a) (requiring each civil case be set for a mediated
settlement conference within forty-five days prior to trial).
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(including state-law class claims) will be released, and file a joint
motion asking the court to approve the settlement. At the time the
parties reach their settlement, there are still 225 FLSA opt-ins and
1500 possible state-law class members.
Although the court previously rebuffed ABC’s efforts to eliminate
the state-law claims from the action, in reviewing the settlementapproval motion, the Edwards court now finds the Ellis court’s analysis
on settlement instructive and refuses to approve settlement on a
classwide basis. In Ellis, the parties had reached a global settlement,
including settlement and release of both state and federal claims on a
classwide basis, and the court was faced with the parties’ joint motion
126
for preliminary approval of the settlement. The Ellis court began its
analysis with a discussion of the differences between the opt-in and
opt-out provisions and how “inertia” fostered low opt-in rates in FLSA
collective actions as well as low opt-out rates in class actions, meaning
that state-law classes “may even be ‘exponentially greater’” than FLSA
127
collection actions.
The court also pointed out that parties to an opt-in action could
not be bound by a settlement they did not consent to and, therefore,
128
that § 216(b) “militated” against a global settlement.
The court
reasoned that dual-filed or “hybrid actions . . . cause[d] . . . FLSA
claims to be ‘swept into the case if class certification is granted,’” and
cited views that a state-law class was “a nice way to wrap around the
opt-in process to get the extra plaintiffs who fall through the
129
cracks.”
The Ellis court continued its analysis by noting that there was at
least the potential that adjudication of the state-law claims, including
130
through settlement, precluded later adjudication of FLSA claims.
The court’s reasoning in this respect was bolstered by the parties’
admission that class members failing to opt out of the state-law class
would be precluded from later pursuing FLSA claims, despite also
131
Although
having failed to opt in to the FLSA collective action.
dissimilar state and federal claims could coexist, “[a]llowing
[p]laintiffs to ‘circumvent the [FLSA] opt-in requirement and bring
unnamed parties into federal court by calling upon state statutes
similar to the FLSA would undermine Congress’s intent to limit these
126. Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 441–42 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
127. Id. at 445 (quoting De Asencio, 342 F.3d at 310).
128. Id. at 446.
129. Id. (quoting Lampe & Rossman, supra note 15, at 315) (internal quotations
omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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132

As a result, despite the
types of claims to collective actions.’”
parties’ joint motion to approve settlement and the absence of any
objection to a state-law class, the court dismissed the plaintiffemployees’ parallel state claims and allowed notice only to federal
133
opt-in plaintiffs.
Like the court in Ellis, the Edwards court dismisses the state-law
class claims and allows the parties to provide notice of settlement only
to the 225 FLSA opt-ins. The court allows release of both state and
federal claims as to those 225 individuals only.
2.

The dilemma: The two possible outcomes of an attack on a state-law class
Without regard to the accuracy of the Edwards court’s decision and
the potential appealability thereof, the Edwards case demonstrates the
dilemma that parties face in dual-filed wage suits. Regardless of the
myriad of arguments the parties make in support of and in
opposition to the inclusion of a state-law class, there exists, at least in
the authorities outlined above, only two possible outcomes: either
(1) the court sides with the plaintiff-employees and maintains the
Rule 23 action within the FLSA collective action or (2) the court sides
with the defendant-employer and strikes or dismisses the state-law
134
class allegations without prejudice.
Even when courts sever the
Rule 23 class from the action, the state-law class claims are still
available within a state forum and the plaintiff-employees need only
135
re-file.
In those cases, allegations are merely stricken or dismissed
with prejudice; the state-law claims are not affected in any substantive

132. Id. at 451–52 (quoting Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 523
(M.D. Pa. 2006)).
133. Id. at 442, 452.
134. See, e.g., Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(certifying Rule 23 class); Osby v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 07-cv-06085-NKL, 2008 WL
2074102, at *1 (W.D. Mo. May 14, 2008) (denying motion to strike or for judgment
on the pleadings); Guzman v. VLM, Inc., No. 07-CV-1126 (JG)(RER), 2008 WL
597186, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2008) (granting Rule 23 class notice); Di Nardo v.
Ned Stevens Gutter Cleaning & Installation, Inc., No. 07-5529 (SRC), 2008 WL
565765, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2008) (denying Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Thorpe v.
Abbott Labs., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (denying motion to
dismiss or strike); Sjoblom v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:07-cv-0451-bbc, 2007
WL 4560541, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2007) (denying Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f)
motion). For cases striking or dismissing state-law class allegations, see infra note 136
and accompanying text.
135. See Warner v. Orleans Home Builders, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 583, 590 (E.D. Pa.
2008) (discussing appropriateness of eliminating state-law class allegations on basis
that court could dismiss without prejudice and plaintiffs could refile); see also Ramsey
v. Ryan Beck & Co., No. 07-635, 2007 WL 2234567, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007)
(same).

538

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:515

136

The issue resolved is only that the opt-in and opt-out groups
way.
cannot proceed together in a single action.
II. ALLOWING PARALLEL STATE WAGE CLAIMS RESULTS IN THE
LOSS OF FEDERAL CLAIMS FOR NON-OPT-IN INDIVIDUALS
AND EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES THE FLSA
The problems that arise in a dual-filed wage lawsuit, or in any suit
including a state-law wage claim that parallels the FLSA, stem from
the fact that all class members are automatically included in the class,
137
unless they opt out.
This is problematic (1) because individuals
who fail to opt in to the FLSA collective action and fail to opt out of
the state-law class action, either through lacking notice or apathy,
may be precluded from bringing those claims in the future; and,
(2) because allowing an opt-out class to proceed on a parallel state
claim effectively eliminates the FLSA.
A. Precluding Potential Claimants’ Future FLSA Claims Despite
Not Opting In to the FLSA Collective Action
Besides thwarting Congress’s intent in amending the FLSA and
circumventing the opt-in provision, as discussed both above and
further below, a primary concern in allowing state-law wage claims
that parallel the FLSA is that any settlement or judgment may
preclude claimants who did not opt in to the FLSA group from
pursuing those FLSA claims at a later date. A number of courts
examining
the
propriety
of
dual-filed
§ 216(b)/Rule 23 actions have addressed preclusion of an
individual’s FLSA claims even when he or she does not opt in to the
138
collective action. Many of these courts have determined that when
136. See Warner, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 590 (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion and
dismissing Rule 23 claims without prejudice); Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 250
F.R.D. 178, 190, 190 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (striking class allegations but noting
availability of individual state-law claims within FLSA collective action); Evancho v.
Sanofi-Aventis U.S. Inc., No. 07-2266 (MLC), 2007 WL 4546100, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec.
19, 2007) (granting motion to strike); Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d
439, 452, 462 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (dismissing parallel state claims without reference to
“with prejudice”); Riddle v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., No. 05 C 5880, 2007 WL 2746597,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2007) (denying certification of Rule 23 class); Williams v.
Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-0605-RCJ-LRL, 2007 WL 2429149, at *1, *9 (D.
Nev. Aug. 20, 2007) (granting judgment on the pleadings and dismissing state class
claims without reference to “with prejudice”); Ramsey, 2007 WL 2234567, at *1
(dismissing state-law class claims without prejudice).
137. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (providing inclusion in the collective
action only upon the filing of an individual’s written consent), with FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(3)(B) (requiring judgment, whether favorable or not, to encompass all class
members “who have not requested exclusion”).
138. See infra notes 139–141 and accompanying text.
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there exists a Rule 23 class on a state-law wage issue parallel to the
FLSA, an individual who does not opt out of the state-law class will
automatically have his or her FLSA claims adjudicated even if (1) he
or she does not opt in to the FLSA class or (2) the action does not
139
At least one court has determined
contain an FLSA claim.
specifically that “[t]he Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the
legitimate preclusive effect of properly conducted class actions, such
as those brought under Federal Rule 23 and its attendant procedural
140
Additionally, as the Damassia court explained “as in
safeguards.”
any Rule 23(b)(3) class action, potential class members who want to
control their own litigation—and to avoid being bound by the
141
judgment in the class action—are free to opt out of the class.” This
is problematic not only because of the inequities involved in
adjudicating individuals’ claims without their knowledge or consent,
but also because the specific purpose of § 216(b)’s opt-in
requirement is to ensure that only individuals who opt in to the
142
collective action will be bound by the judgment.
Perhaps the Edwards court’s concern, from our hypothetical dualfiled case above, in approving a global settlement releasing all class
members’ claims stemmed from this preclusion issue. In the
hypothetical, only 225 individuals opted in to the FLSA collective
139. See, e.g., Damassia, 250 F.R.D. at 163 (quoting Guzman, 2008 WL 597186, at
*10 n.11) (noting that “concerns about class plaintiffs being bound by res
judicata . . . are misplaced” but recognizing that “[i]t is true that potential class
members who do not opt out of the class action could have ‘all claims that could
have been brought in that action, including any FLSA claim, resolved by res judicata
without opting in to the FLSA action’”); Woodard, 250 F.R.D. at 186 (recognizing that
“the maintenance of the FLSA claim and parallel state law claim in the same action,
where both claims are predicated on the same conduct of the defendant,” produces
a substantial risk that “employees, who neither opt in to the FLSA collective action
nor opt out of the state-law class action, will be collaterally estopped from asserting
FLSA claims in their own right”); Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (commenting that
“there is authority for the proposition that adjudication of similar state law claims
precludes adjudication of claims under FLSA at a later date”).
Indeed, even plaintiffs’ counsel have conceded that potential collective action
members who neither opt in to the FLSA collective action nor opt out of the Rule 23
class will have their FLSA claims adjudicated through the judgment on the Rule 23
class claim. See Woodard, 250 F.R.D. at 187 n.7 (specifying that it was Mr. Woodard’s
counsel who conceded this point and that it was the “individual’s choice” to have this
happen); Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (emphasizing that members are “forever
bound” by this judgment).
140. Gardner v. W. Beef Props., Inc., No. 07-CV-2345, 2008 WL 2446681, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2008) (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2174 (2008)).
141. Id. at *3 (quoting Damassia, 250 F.R.D. at 163).
142. See, e.g., Woodard, 250 F.R.D. at 185, 188 (noting Congress’s intent in ensuring
that “only employees who affirmatively opt in will be bound by the judgment” and in
protecting “employees—who may have no desire at the present moment to file a
lawsuit under the FLSA—from having their FLSA rights adjudicated without their
knowledge by purported class representatives whose interest may not be aligned with
those whom they purport to represent”).
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action, but there were 1500 potential state-law class members. Thus,
if none of the remaining 1275 individuals who neither opted in to the
FLSA collective action nor opted out of the state-law class action
exclude themselves from the settlement, all 1275 individuals would
lose their FLSA claims. Those individuals would otherwise be able to
raise their FLSA claims individually, had the lead plaintiffs and their
counsel not attempted to include an opt-out state-law class action.
In addition to the general inequities involved in having one’s
federal wage claim precluded from later adjudication, despite not
having consented to participate in the FLSA collective action, the
preclusion of future claims is significant in at least two other contexts
143
First, in circumstances when they are unable to certify a
as well.
Rule 23 class in a particular suit, especially with regard to Rule 23’s
144
numerosity requirement, plaintiff-employees have sometimes simply
re-filed their suit in other jurisdictions until they hit upon a court
145
willing to certify the class. Some attorneys have “‘adopted a strategy
of filing in as many courts as necessary until’” they are able to have a
146
And, although some commentators have
Rule 23 class certified.
determined that there is “hope that plaintiffs may be precluded from
147
taking ‘multiple bites’ at the same certification ‘apple’” in this
148
manner, some courts have determined otherwise.
149
For example, in Davidson v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas determined that a
court’s order denying conditional Rule 23 class certification in a
previous case was not a final decision that would preclude relitigation
150
in a similar and later case against the same defendant. Rather, the
143. See infra notes 144–165 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of finality
of a denial of claim certification and successful plaintiffs’ attorneys’ tactics in re-filing
claim certifications in different venues until finding a court willing to grant
certification).
144. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (stating that a class can potentially be so large that
joining all members of that class would be impractical).
145. See Lampe & Rossman, supra note 15, at 335 (citing In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 764 (7th Cir.
2003)) (describing the Bridgestone/Firestone plaintiffs’ counsel’s determination to find
a court that would hear their case, resulting in five filings of nationwide class
actions).
146. Id. (quoting Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 764).
147. Id.
148. See infra notes 149–152 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in
Davidson v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, which exemplifies that a class certification is not
a final order, thus providing plaintiffs’ opportunity to re-file class certification in
different court).
149. 553 F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
150. See id. at 706–07 (rejecting defendant’s argument that class certification is
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because class certification had been
denied in a previous case).
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court determined that an order denying class certification “lack[ed]
sufficient finality to be entitled to preclusive effect while the
151
Thus, defendantunderlying litigation remains pending.”
employers may be required to suffer defending numerous lawsuits in
which courts repeatedly deny Rule 23 class certification until one
judge grants class certification because “[a] single positive trumps all
152
the negatives.”
Furthermore, preclusion is another issue for cases where plaintiffemployees and defendant-employers reach a settlement that includes
the state-law class. As at least one commentator has posited, a
settlement including an opt-out class claim “enables plaintiffs’ lawyers
and defendants to settle class lawsuits on mutually beneficial terms
153
that exploit class members.”
Such a settlement would benefit the
defendant-employer because if the state-law class were included, the
settlement would bind all potential class members and include a
release that would insulate them from future lawsuits by every
154
individual in the class who did not opt out.
In order to address the issues related to preclusion of plaintiffs’
claims in a dual-filed action, courts frequently authorize sending an
early court-facilitated notice to all potential FLSA collective action
155
members. This notice “can create settlement pressure early in the
action, before plaintiffs’ counsel expends significant resources,
because it signals the potential expansion of the case and the need
156
These dual
for significant and expensive class-wide discovery.”
settlements, where both an FLSA and state-law wage claims are
released, sweep all potential FLSA collective action members into the
release for the same reasons that FLSA claims are precluded when an

151. Id. at 706 (citation omitted).
152. See Lampe & Rossman, supra note 15, at 335 (emphasizing that when one
nationwide class is certified, all the previous noncertification decisions fade into
insignificance (citing In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 333 F.3d 763, 766–67 (7th
Cir. 2003))).
153. See John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 903, 903 (2005) (noting that in such a settlement the class members lose their
right to bring their own suit, while plaintiffs’ lawyers receive a hefty fee for their work
and defendants insulate themselves from future lawsuits by every class member).
154. See id. at 904–05 (explaining that defendant-employers prefer to settle such
claims, instead of litigating them and running the risk of a large damages award to
the plaintiffs).
155. See Lampe & Rossman, supra note 15, at 315 (explaining that notice is a lowcost method of identifying persons who are likely to have case-related information
and who are willing to work with plaintiffs’ counsel as witnesses).
156. Id. (citing Attorneys Discuss Strategies for Bringing, Defending FLSA Collective
Action Lawsuits, 156 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at C-1 (Aug. 13, 2002)).

542

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:515

individual neither opts in to the FLSA class nor opts out of the state157
law class.
Similarly, preclusion of possible claimants’ future FLSA claims is
also troublesome from a practical perspective. Generally, it has been
the role of defendant-employers to alert the court to the problems
associated with preclusion in conjunction with their various
158
arguments against including a state-law class.
However, courts
evaluating the preclusion issue have rebuked defendant-employers
for raising the issue and questioned defendant-employers’ seemingly
159
It also makes
inconsistent concern for absent employees’ rights.
sense that employers would not truly be concerned with their
employees’ freedom to sue them in the future, especially after they
have suffered through one round of litigation on the issue already.
Rather, as is the case when the parties reach a settlement, employers
are more likely to argue in favor of a global release of all claims
against them.
Despite the potential for insincerity in defendant-employers’
“concern” for absent individuals’ rights, the reality is that if the
preclusion issue is not raised by the defendant-employers or on a
court’s own accord, the issue may not be raised at all. As described
earlier, it is the opportunity for a large state-law class that drives
plaintiffs’ counsel to pursue wage claims and has made suits featuring
160
a state-law claim the action “du jour” for the plaintiffs’ bar.
Individual wage claims and opt-in FLSA claims are unattractive
because those actions result in substantially lower damage awards, in
part because the FLSA has a shorter statute of limitations and
because the FLSA does not allow the limitations period to be tolled
161
until individuals opt in.
Damage awards are also substantially
157. Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
158. See, e.g., Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 870, 889 (N.D.
Iowa 2008) (rejecting the defendant-employer’s argument that allowing both actions
to proceed would have serious legal ramifications for the potential plaintiffs who did
not opt-in); Guzman v. VLM, Inc., No. 07-CV-1126 (JG)(RER), 2008 WL 597186, at
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2008) (rejecting defendant-employers’ argument that those
individuals who fail to opt-out of the state-law class action will be precluded from
opting-in to the FLSA action).
159. See Bouaphakeo, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 889 n.11 (stating that the court did not
believe that Tyson was genuinely concerned about preclusion of absent individuals’
claims); Guzman, 2008 WL 597186, at *10 n.11 (“The defendants, apparently in an
abundance of concern for the rights of absent Rule 23 class members, are worried
that someone who fails to opt out of the Rule 23 class action will have all claims that
could have been brought in that action, including any FLSA claim, resolved by res
judicata without opting in to the FLSA action.”).
160. See supra note 17 (explaining why plaintiffs’ counsel prefer state-law claims).
161. See Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of
a Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1330 (2008)
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limited because, in a Rule 23 claim, the court can award damages
based on the entire class’s alleged injury, resulting in full, class-wide
162
damages. Thus, the potential for a lower aggregate recovery makes
individual wage claims or FLSA opt-in claims less attractive to
plaintiffs’ counsel because the attorney’s fees they recover, for
example in settlement, are substantially lower.
The combination of these factors, low participation and limited
recovery ability, make it “hard to find a lawyer who will take” an
163
individual wage claim or an opt-in class action. In the words of one
commentator, the class action is “perhaps the most powerful tool that
164
plaintiffs can wield.”
The incentives for plaintiffs’ counsel to
pursue state wage claims, either in a dual-filed action with the FLSA
165
or in lieu of an FLSA claim, are therefore numerous.
The consequential reality, then, is that there are likely no
circumstances under which a plaintiffs’ attorney will raise concern
about preclusion and absent potential claimants’ ability to file FLSA
claims in the future. Rather, plaintiffs’ counsel will seek the higher
paying state-law class cases which may result in preclusion of some
potential plaintiffs’ claims. Protection of these precluded claims
must come, as a result, through defendant-employers’ potentially
insincere arguments about preclusion, the court’s own evaluation of
the preclusion issue, or elimination of the parallel state-law claim
altogether.

(noting that defendant-employers can reduce their damage exposure if they delay
the opt-in process because every day that passes before consents are filed is a day less
of potential liability).
162. See id. at 1331–32 (noting that these full, class-wide damages can be made to
an appropriate, alternative recipient when there are unlocatable class members to
ensure that the defendant-employer does not improperly avoid paying damages just
because some class members cannot be located).
163. Id. at 1333.
164. Bronsteen, supra note 153, at 903.
165. Some commentators, as well as some district courts, have even suggested that
Congress should amend the FLSA to eliminate the opt-in requirement because these
opt-in claims are so unattractive and have otherwise touted the benefits of an opt-out
action. See Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(stating that “the opt-out nature of a class action is a valuable feature lacking in an
FLSA collective action” (quoting Guzman v. VLM, Inc., No. 07-CV-1126 (JG)(RER),
2008 WL 597186, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2008))); Becker & Strauss, supra note 161,
at 1319 (theorizing that the FLSA’s opt-in requirement is unjust, unwise public
policy, and incoherent as implemented by courts). However, to allow an FLSA optout action would be to override a congressional mandate that has existed since it
enacted the PPA amendment in 1947.
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B. Side-Stepping or Eliminating the FLSA through Pursuit
of a Parallel State Claim
The unattractiveness of an individual state wage claim or FLSA optin collective action has led to an “explosion” of lawsuits either
(1) including both state and federal wage claims to take advantage of
the availability of Rule 23, or (2) foregoing or shunning the FLSA
166
altogether.
As noted above, the opt-in requirement substantially
limits the size of the group action, generating participation between
167
only fifteen and thirty percent. One commentator reasons that this
low participation is caused by complications inherent in the notice
process, including that (1) many potential collective-action members
never receive the notice; (2) potential collective-action members
throw away notices; and (3) even when potential collective-action
members actually receive, read, and understand notices, they are
unlikely to participate because they realize they are being solicited to
168
However, these notice process difficulties are
join a lawsuit.
ultimately indicative of why parallel state-law claims should not
proceed as a Rule 23 class either.
Although the FLSA does not require notice to potential collective
action members, many courts have determined that providing notice
169
is appropriate.
Likewise, when a court certifies a Rule 23 class, it
will authorize notice to putative class members in much the same
170
However, the same problems that
form as an FLSA opt-in notice.
166. See Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 459 n.19 (W.D. Pa.
2007) (describing the “recent phenomenon” of an “‘explosion’ of hybrid lawsuits
involving both state and FLSA claims”) (internal citation omitted); Lampe &
Rossman, supra note 15, at 314 (noting that “some plaintiffs’ counsel shun the FLSA
altogether in favor of analogous state statutes or state common law claims”).
167. See Becker & Strauss, supra note 161, at 1325–26, 1326 n.56 (noting an even
lower opt-in participation rate and emphasizing a 2.7% opt-in rate in another case
(citing De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 310 (3d Cir. 2003))); Lampe &
Rossman, supra note 15, at 313–14 (estimating that opt-in participation in non-unionbacked cases is fifteen to thirty percent).
168. See Becker & Strauss, supra note 161, at 1326–28 (noting that because mailed
notice yields a low number of opt-in plaintiffs, courts have approved additional forms
of notice, such as radio, newspaper, or postings in gathering spots in neighborhoods
where employees are likely to live).
169. See, e.g., Laroque v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 557 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (stating that “[d]istrict courts have discretion under [§ 216(b)] to direct a
defendant employer to disclose the names and addresses of similarly situated
potential plaintiffs and to authorize the sending of notice to these individuals, so that
they may ‘opt in’ to the collective action”); Tremblay v. Chevron Stations Inc., No. C07-06009 EDL, 2008 WL 2020514, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2008) (“If the Court
decides to certify a collective action, the Court may authorize and facilitate notice to
potential plaintiffs under Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling.”); Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at
462 (authorizing FLSA notice).
170. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (allowing a court to direct appropriate notice to a
class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2), while requiring the court give
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result in low participation in an opt-in action also affect the Rule 23
action. If individuals do not receive notice in opt-in actions because
of issues such as high job turnover and frequent changes of address,
those same individuals will not receive notice in an opt-out class
171
action. Individuals who do not understand an opt-in notice are no
more likely to understand an opt-out notice, or in dual-filed cases, to
172
understand two notices.
Many individuals will not respond as a
result of what courts term the “inertia . . . promot[ing] low response
173
rates.”
The problem, again, is that all class members are automatically
174
Because Congress’s
included in the class unless they opt out.
concern in enacting the PPA amendment to the FLSA was to “make
certain that every employee named as a plaintiff in a wage suit will be
fully aware of such suit and in agreement with its objectives,” allowing
participation in a class action based on parallel state wage laws is
tantamount to overriding Congress’s purpose in requiring opt-in
175
participation. Individuals who do not care enough in the outcome
of their wage claim to opt in to the FLSA suit and who, through
similar apathy, do not bother to opt out of the state-law claim, lack
176
the “personal interest in the outcome” Congress envisioned.

individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort for
a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3)).
171. See Becker & Strauss, supra note 161, at 1326 (outlining the various problems
associated with potential class members not receiving notice in opt-in cases as a result
of various factors, including high turnover in low-wage jobs and frequent changes of
address among low-wage workers).
172. See, e.g., Riddle v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., No. 05 C 5880, 2007 WL 2746597, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2007) (recognizing the “substantial” risk of confusion with optin and opt-out notice); Salazar v. AgriProcessors, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 873, 885 (N.D.
Iowa 2007) (recognizing that “the class notices may be confusing to potential class
members if care is not taken in crafting the notice language”); Becker & Strauss,
supra note 161, at 1327 (noting the likelihood of potential class members not
understanding the notice as a result of finding the language “confusing,
intimidating, or threatening”).
173. See Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (“The same inertia that promotes low
response rates in opt-in collective actions fosters low opt-out rates in class actions
maintained under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).” (citing Finkel, supra note 118, at 162)).
174. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (allowing inclusion in the collective action
only upon an individual’s written consent), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(b)
(requiring judgment, whether favorable or not, to encompass all class members “who
have not requested exclusion”).
175. BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 49; see also Woodard v. FedEx
Freight E., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178, 186 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (stating that Congress’s intent
in enacting the PPA amendment was to “ensure that ‘absent individuals would not
have their rights litigated without their input or knowledge’” (quoting Ellis, 527 F.
Supp. 2d at 450)).
176. See, e.g., Warner v. Orleans Home Builders, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588
(E.D. Pa. 2008) (explaining Congress’s intent in enacting the PPA amendment as
being to “curb the ‘excessive litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a personal
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However, when state claims parallel their federal counterpart,
whether in a Rule 23 action or as an individual claim, those state
claims effectively supplant or eliminate the FLSA claim altogether.
177
When plaintiffs’ counsel “shun” the FLSA claim in order to “wrap
178
around the opt-in [requirement] to get to the extra plaintiffs,” the
result is that the parties’ and the court’s focus is on the state-law class
179
claim rather than the FLSA claim.
However, this is in direct
contravention of Congress’s intention in regulating wage-and-hour
180
law. Indeed, many courts looking at the practical effect that a large
opt-out class has on a dual-filed FLSA action have determined that to
allow the state-law class to proceed would be effectively “allowing a
181
Allowing a
federal tail to wag what is in substance a state dog.”
state-law class in a case in which the state claims pleaded parallel the
FLSA has exactly that effect: letting employees seek what is really just
federal relief under the guise of a state statute or state common-law
182
claim solely to avoid the limitations in a federal opt-in action.

interest in the outcome’” (quoting Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165,
173 (1989))).
177. Lampe & Rossman, supra note 15, at 314 (noting that “some plaintiffs’
counsel shun the FLSA altogether in favor of analogous state statutes or state
common law claims”).
178. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (quoting Lampe & Rossman, supra note 15, at
315).
179. See id. (noting that FLSA claims get “swept into” the Rule 23 claims in a
hybrid action).
180. See, e.g., Warner, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 588 (describing Congress’s intent in
enacting the PPA amendment as being to “‘limit[] private FLSA plaintiffs to
employees who asserted claims in their own right,’ and thus curb the ‘excessive
litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a personal interest in the outcome’” (quoting
Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 173)); Woodard, 250 F.R.D. at 182–83 (concluding that
when state and FLSA claims are predicated on identical facts and statutory rights,
simultaneous prosecution of the state claim undermines Congress’s objectives in
enacting the PPA amendment); Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 451–52 (emphasizing that
“[a]llowing [p]laintiffs to ‘circumvent the [FLSA] opt-in requirement and bring
unnamed parties into federal court by calling on state statutes similar to the FLSA
would undermine Congress’s intent’” (quoting Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F.
Supp. 2d 522, 523 (M.D. Pa. 2006))); Evancho v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. Inc., No. 072266 (MLC), 2007 WL 4546100, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2007) (determining that
plaintiffs cannot “circumvent the opt-in requirement . . . by calling upon state
statutes similar to the FLSA” (quoting Moeck v. Gray Supply Corp., No. 03-1950
(WGB), 2006 WL 42368, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2006))).
181. De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining
that a court will generally dismiss the state claim when it constitutes the real body of
the case, to which the federal case is only an appendage); see Riddle v. Nat’l Sec.
Agency, Inc., No. 05 C 5880, 2007 WL 2746597, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2007)
(refusing to grant class certification on the state-law claim because of the
fundamentally conflicting nature of a large opt-out state-law class and a much smaller
opt-in FLSA class).
182. See cases cited supra note 180 (describing Congress’s intent in enacting the
FLSA opt-in requirement); supra sources cited note 165 (highlighting the arguments
in favor of an amendment to the FLSA eliminating the opt-in requirement).
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Consequently, numerous courts have determined that plaintiffemployees cannot seek Rule 23 class certification in an FLSA claim,
that is, bring a “Rule 23 FLSA class” rather than a state-law Rule 23
183
However, when the state-law claim underlying the Rule 23
class.
class is parallel to the FLSA claim, the result is a de facto Rule 23
FLSA class. To allow a state-law class based upon state law would be
to allow plaintiffs to avoid the parallel federal opt-in requirement
184
entirely.
There are several ways plaintiff-employees can avoid pleading an
FLSA claim and, instead, rely solely upon parallel state claims in
order to avoid the opt-in requirement. For instance, if the plaintiffs
want a federal court to hear their case, they can plead a single federal
claim, such as for minimum wage, overtime, retaliation, or
recordkeeping violations (or even, perhaps, discrimination), and
plead the remaining claims under parallel state laws using
185
supplemental jurisdiction.
Similarly, plaintiff-employees could
maintain a state-law-only action in federal court using the Class
186
Action Fairness Action Act (“CAFA”), which provides for original
187
jurisdiction over state-law claims if certain circumstances exist.
Plaintiff-employees may also proceed with a state-law wage claim in
188
Under any of these circumstances, if the plaintiffstate court.
183. See, e.g., Ellison v. Autozone Inc., No. C06-07522 MJJ, 2007 WL 2701923, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (rejecting defendant’s reliance on Kinney and concluding
that certification schemes under Rule 23 and FLSA are irreconcilable by stating, “this
reliance is misplaced because Kinney merely stands for the proposition that Rule 23
procedures should not be used to certify an FLSA class. Plaintiff does not attempt to
certify a FLSA collective class under Rule 23, but rather intends to prosecute both
under their respective procedures.” (citing Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d
859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at
170)); Lehman v. Legg Mason, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(“Defendants’ arguments would be well-taken if Plaintiff were attempting to bring a
Rule 23 class action to enforce rights under the FLSA. Such a suit is clearly
impermissible and a court would have no choice but to dismiss a complaint to that
effect.”).
184. See supra note 180 (describing Congress’s intent in enacting the FLSA opt-in
requirement).
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (allowing a federal court to exercise jurisdiction
over all other claims that form part of the same case or controversy).
186. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (Supp. V 2005) (granting original federal jurisdiction
over any civil action where the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and certain
diversity of citizenship circumstances are met); see also Jackson v. Alpharma Inc., Civ.
No. 07-3250 (GEB), 2008 WL 508664, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2008) (determining that
it is premature to rule on a Rule 23 attack when plaintiffs have pleaded CAFA
jurisdiction); Ellison, 2007 WL 2701923, at *2 (refusing to strike the plaintiffs’ statelaw claims because the court had independent jurisdiction over the claims under
CAFA).
188. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (“[T]he court is unpersuaded that permitting a separate suit to go forward on
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employees were seeking redress under state laws that are parallel to
the FLSA, they could maintain a Rule 23 opt-out class based on the
same legal principles as the FLSA, despite Congress’s intent to limit
wage claims under the FLSA’s terms to opt-in actions.
III. SALVAGING INDIVIDUALS’ FLSA CLAIMS AND THE FLSA’S OVERALL
INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH PREEMPTION
In order to avoid the problems associated with allowing Rule 23
classes to litigate state statutory or common-law claims that parallel
the FLSA, the state claims must somehow be eliminated from the
equation. As outlined above, defendant-employers across the country
189
have argued for the exclusion of state-law class claims.
However,
the result is always one of only two outcomes: either the court
maintains the state-law class with the FLSA collective action or it
dismisses the state-law class claims without prejudice, leaving the
190
plaintiff-employees to refile in state court. Thus, the solution must
include a mechanism that allows for dismissal of the state-law claims
with prejudice, preferably, as soon after commencement as possible
to avoid expensive and arduous discovery.
In actuality, courts addressing dual-filed FLSA and Rule 23 state
class claims need not look to issues of inherent incompatibility,
supplemental jurisdiction, Rule 23 prerequisites, the Rules Enabling
Act (“REA”), or any of the other positions outlined above. Rather,
the FLSA preempts state-law claims (whether class based or
individualized) to the extent that those state laws are parallel to the
FLSA. Therefore, in the context of the hypothetical Edwards case
discussed above, the defendant employer, ABC Corporation, could
have successfully moved to dismiss the state-law class as preempted.
This would have saved the briefing, argument, and analysis on Rules
12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), 12(c), 12(f), and 23 with regard to inherent
incompatibility, supplemental jurisdiction, superiority of a class
state law claims somehow undermines the congressional intent in providing an opt-in
class action format under the FLSA.”).
189. See supra Part II.B (detailing the various theories under which defendantemployers seek to have the state-law claims excluded, including Rule 12(b)(6), Rule
12(b)(1), Rule 12(c), Rule 12(f), and Rule 23)); see also De Asencio v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that the district court erroneously
exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim); Warner v. Orleans
Home Builders, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 583, 590 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (granting the
defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss the state-law claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6)); Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178, 186 (M.D. Pa. 2008)
(granting motion to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) and Rule 23(f)).
190. See supra Part II.B (explaining that, despite the many arguments made by
defendants, courts ultimately reach one of two decisions: dismiss the state claims or
allow the action to go forward with both state and federal claims).
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action, and the REA. It would also have prevented both parties from
conducting discovery on state class claims with multiple depositions
and document production in the tens of thousands of pages. The
Edwards court would not have needed to evaluate, and the parties
would not have needed to brief and argue, the plaintiff-employees’
motion for class certification. Rather, the court would have evaluated
the nature of the state-law claims as being more generous than,
parallel to, or less generous than the FLSA and assessed whether the
FLSA preempted the state-law claims.
Numerous courts have analyzed the issue of whether and to what
191
The most common
extent the FLSA preempts state-law claims.
types of preemption include express preemption, field preemption,
192
and obstacle preemption.
For example, in Anderson v. Sara Lee
193
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined
whether the FLSA preempted state-law claims for breach of contract,
194
negligence, and fraud related to violations of the FLSA.
In
Anderson, the plaintiff-employees did not actually plead a cause of
195
action under the FLSA.
In reversing the district court’s ruling that the FLSA did not
preempt the state-law claims, the Anderson court began by stating that
it was “guided by longstanding principles of preemption in our
assessment of whether the FLSA invalidates the Class Members’
196
The court then stated that the Constitution’s
remaining claims.”
Supremacy Clause “render[ed] federal law the supreme Law of the
Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
191. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2007)
(remanding the state-law claims for contract, negligence, and fraud for dismissal
without prejudice as preempted by the FLSA); Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
208 F.3d 1144, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining that fraud claims are not
preempted but that claims “that are directly covered by the FLSA (such as overtime
and retaliation disputes) must be brought under the FLSA”); Lopez v. Flight Servs. &
Sys., Inc., No. 07-CV-6186 CJS, 2008 WL 203028, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2008)
(determining that state common-law claims for fraud, breach of contract, breach of
good faith, tortious interference with contract, and unjust enrichment were
preempted by the FLSA); Nimmons v. RBC Ins. Holdings (USA) Inc., No. 6:07-cv2637, 2007 WL 4571179, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 27, 2007) (dismissing claims for breach of
contract, wrongful termination, and wrongful retention of overtime pay because they
“are not viable and . . . [are] duplicative of the rights and remedies available under
the FLSA”).
192. See, e.g., Anderson, 508 F.3d at 191–92 (outlining preemption rules);
Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1149–50 (same); Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp.
2d 439, 449–50 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (same).
193. 508 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2007).
194. See id. at 191–95 (concluding that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims were
preempted by the FLSA).
195. See id. at 184 (noting that the five claims pleaded include state claims for
breach of contract, negligence, fraud, conversion, and unfair trade practices).
196. Id. at 191.
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Contrary notwithstanding . . . . As a result, federal statutes and
regulations properly enacted and promulgated can nullify conflicting
197
Continuing its analysis, the court then
state or local actions.”
outlined the three main types of preemption: “express preemption,”
198
“field preemption,” and “conflict preemption.”
The Fourth Circuit noted in Anderson that Sara Lee, the defendantemployer, had argued that conflict preemption was in play and that
conflict preemption occurred when “state law ‘actually conflicts with
199
federal law.’” The court continued by outlining that the assessment
of whether federal and state law actually conflicted included analysis
of “whether ‘it is impossible to comply with both state and federal
law’ or ‘whether the state law stands as an obstacle to the
200
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives’ of federal law.”
201
The court noted that it was “obstacle preemption” that Sara Lee
asserted was at issue.
After defining the analytical framework, the Anderson court turned
to Congress’s purpose in enacting the FLSA, stating that “Congress
enacted the FLSA to eliminate ‘labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
202
efficiency, and general well-being of workers’” and that “the FLSA
203
According
provides an unusually elaborate enforcement scheme.”
to the court, the plaintiffs did not rely on North Carolina state law to
recover unpaid wages but, instead, invoked state law as a source of
remedies, including a longer statute of limitations and the availability
204
of punitive damages. The court further reasoned that as a result of
the FLSA’s “unusually elaborate enforcement scheme, there cannot
be the exceptionally strong presumption against preemption of such
197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. Id. (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985); Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 453 (4th Cir. 2005); S. Blasting
Servs., Inc. v. Wilkes County, 288 F.3d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 2002)). Express preemption
exists when “‘Congress expressly declares its intent to preempt state law,’ . . . and
field preemption occurs when Congress ‘occup[ies] the field’ by regulating so
pervasively that there is no room left for the states to supplement federal law.”
Anderson, 508 F.3d at 191 n.10 (quoting Pinney, 402 F.3d at 453; Cox v. Shalala, 112
F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1997)).
199. Anderson, 508 F.3d at 191 (quoting S. Blasting, 288 F.3d at 590).
200. Id. at 191–92 (quoting Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1305 (4th
Cir. 1992)).
201. Id. at 192.
202. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000)).
203. Id. (quoting Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, 174 F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir.
1999)).
204. Id. at 193 (contrasting North Carolina’s three year statute of limitations on
contract claims and provision of punitive damages upon a showing of “fraud, malice,
or willful or wanton conduct” with FLSA’s more limited enforcement mechanisms)
(quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a) (2007)).
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state remedies that would be warranted if the FLSA did not provide
205
Thus, the court concluded that the plaintifffederal remedies.”
employees’ state-law claims were preempted under the obstaclepreemption theory because the FLSA’s enforcement scheme was “an
206
exclusive one.”
Although the claims in Anderson were common-law claims that
depended on the FLSA rather than state statutory wage claims to
establish a violation, the Anderson court also noted, in dictum, that at
least one other circuit court had determined that “[c]laims that are
directly covered by the FLSA (such as overtime and retaliation
207
disputes) must be brought under the FLSA.”
Furthermore,
preemption of parallel state-law claims really only affects plaintiffemployees’ (and, maybe more accurately, their counsel’s) ability to
use Rule 23 to effect a class action rather than being relegated to a
smaller opt-out collective action. It does not affect recovery rights, as
numerous courts have recognized that there is no right to double
recovery even when plaintiffs are allowed to plead FLSA and parallel
208
state wage claims. That is to say, if employees were successful on a
dual-filed wage claim, they would not recover twice the minimum
wage or two helpings of overtime compensation. Rather, the
209
“exclusive” remedial structure the FLSA provides entitles employees
210
to a single recovery, making the state claim superfluous. The statelaw claim’s only purpose, then, is to trigger the plaintiff-employees’
ability, or that of their counsel, to seek greater gains through a Rule
23 class action.
Part of the preemption analysis, in addition to the examination of
whether a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of

205. Id.
206. Id. at 194.
207. Id. at 195 n.12 (quoting Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144,
1154 (9th Cir. 2000)).
208. See, e.g., Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1348 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Of
course, the plaintiffs may not recover twice for the same violation; the breach of
contract claim survives merely as an alternative legal theory to redress any wrong that
may have been done them.”); Davis v. Lenox Hill Hosp., No. 03 Civ.3746 DLC, 2004
WL 1926087, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004) (“Insofar as the defendants’ argument is
about overtime compensation, they correctly note that Davis cannot recover under
both federal and state law for the enforcement of the same right.”) (emphasis
omitted); Bolduc v. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (D. Me.
1998) (“Thus, the Roman court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to a double
recovery when he pleads both federal and state claims for the same overtime pay.”).
209. Anderson, 508 F.3d at 194.
210. See id. at 193 (noting that employees did not seek unpaid wages through state
claims but instead sought remedies not provided for in the FLSA, including a longer
statute of limitations and punitive damages).
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the federal law’s full purposes, involves the FLSA’s “savings clause,”
which provides:
No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall
excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal
ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum
wage established under this chapter or a maximum workweek lower
211
than the maximum workweek established under this chapter . . . .
212

The court in Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., while declining to
evaluate specifically whether parallel state-law claims were
preempted, relied upon preemption analysis and the savings clause to
determine whether a state-law class could coexist with an FLSA
213
collective action. Specifically, the court noted that,
The terms of the saving clause are clear and narrowly drawn:
they merely establish a wage and hour “floor” above which the
states are free to rise, and “leave undisturbed ‘the traditional
exercise of the states’ police powers with respect to wages and
214
hours more generous than the federal standards.’”

Ellis emphasized that “[a] saving clause is a ‘statutory provision
exempting from coverage something that would otherwise be
215
included,’” and that despite the savings clause’s limited language,
216
This
some courts refused to preempt parallel state-law claims.”
decision thus determined that “[t]he language of the saving clause
217
simply [could not] be stretched so far.”
In other words, the existence of the FLSA’s savings clause
218
demonstrates Congress’s intent, without respect to § 216(b)
specifically, to preempt state-law claims that were equal to or less
219
generous than the FLSA’s terms. The savings clause thus provides
211. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2000).
212. 527 F. Supp. 2d 439 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
213. Id. at 449–52 (examining the policies supporting the FLSA, such as reduction
of minimum wage litigation, in order to infer that Congress intended the FLSA to
preempt certain state-law provisions).
214. Id. at 450 (quoting Lehman v. Legg Mason, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 726, 731
(M.D. Pa. 2007)) (emphasis omitted).
215. Id. at 450 n.14 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1371 (8th ed. 2004)).
216. Id. at 450–51 (citing Lehman and Beltran-Benitez v. Sea Safari, Ltd., 180 F.
Supp. 2d 772 (E.D.N.C. 2001), as examples of courts that found the FLSA savings
clause did not preempt state statutory remedies on overtime and minimum wage
claims)).
217. Id. at 451.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (stating types of damages allowed for a successful
FLSA claimant, including monetary compensation for wages withheld and
reasonable attorney’s fees).
219. See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2000) (allowing states to set greater minimum wage,
maximum hour and child labor protections than the FLSA provides); Ellis, 527 F.
Supp. 2d at 450 (noting Congress’s intent “leave undisturbed ‘the traditional
exercise of the states’ police powers with respect to wages and hours more generous
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that only claims that are more generous are “exempt[ed] from
coverage . . . that would otherwise be” preempted, to use the
220
definition. As a result, there are two primary categories of state-law
claims that can exist, those that are more generous than the FLSA
and those that are not. There does not seem to be any dispute that
state laws that are more generous are not preempted based on the
221
savings clause’s language. The debate, rather, is on what constitutes
222
If a
a parallel claim and what constitutes a more generous claim.
state law is more generous than the FLSA, a court would not review
the law for preemption but would instead proceed with the lines of
analysis described above, including for example, whether the moregenerous state-law claim substantially predominated the FLSA claim
223
and/or presented novel or complex legal issues.
The issue, then, is what constitutes a parallel claim, including
within both statutory wage laws and common-law claims. Within this
category, there are also two types of potential claims, including (1)
224
those that are “directly covered” by the FLSA, such as state statutory
claims for unpaid overtime compensation and minimum wages; and,
(2) those that provide another legal theory for recovery or different
remedies, such as common-law claims for contribution or
225
indemnification, breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment.
With regard to state statutory wage claims specifically, several
courts at the circuit- and district-court level have determined that

than the federal standards’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lehman, 532 F. Supp. 2d at
731)); Morrow v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (M.D.
Ala. 2005) (recognizing that “the FLSA does not preempt state law contract
provisions that are more generous than the FLSA demands” (quoting Freeman v.
City of Mobile, 146 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 1998))); Cranford v. City of Slidell, 25
F. Supp. 2d 727, 728 (E.D. La. 1998) (stating that “the FLSA permits states to adopt
higher standards than those established in the Act”).
220. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 450 n.14 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1371 (8th
ed. 2004)).
221. See § 218(a); Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1421 (9th
Cir. 1990) (explaining that FLSA § 218 demonstrates congressional intent to leave
undisturbed state police power to enforce wage and hour restrictions more generous
than those granted by the FLSA); Keeley v. Loomis Fargo & Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 517,
520 (D.N.J. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 183 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that
FLSA § 218 “expressly contemplates that workers covered by state law as well as FLSA
shall have any additional benefits provided by the state law” (quoting Williams v.
W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
222. E.g., Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000)
(analyzing whether the state law is parallel by applying a conflict preemption
analysis).
223. See supra Parts I.B and I.C (discussing defenses and counterarguments to
parallel state-law claims in FLSA cases).
224. Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1154.
225. See infra notes 228, 229, 231 and accompanying text (discussing when parallel
state-law claims are preempted by the FLSA).
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claims “directly covered by the FLSA (such as overtime and
226
retaliation disputes) must be brought under the FLSA.” Moreover,
the Anderson decision noted this Ninth Circuit assertion at the end of
227
its preemption analysis of certain state common-law claims. Other
courts have also determined that claims are preempted when they are
228
229
“duplicative of” the FLSA claims, “based on the same facts” as the
230
FLSA claims, “equivalent to” the FLSA claims or that are “premised
231
232
on a failure to pay overtime,” “mirror[]” FLSA damages, or have
233
the same remedies as the FLSA.
On the other hand, some courts have determined that the FLSA
234
However, those cases are much
does not preempt state wage law.
226. Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1154 (asserting this claim in dicta within a discussion
of FLSA purposes); see, e.g., Frey v. Spokane County Fire Dist. No. 8, No. CV-05-289RHW, 2006 WL 2597956, at *11 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2006) (citing the “directly
covered” language in Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1154); Moeck v. Gray Supply Corp., No.
03-1950 (WGB), 2006 WL 42368, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2006) (recognizing that
“[a]lthough the law is unsettled as to whether the FLSA preempts state common law
causes of action, most courts have held” directly covered claims “must be brought
under the FLSA”); Flores v. Albertson’s, Inc., No. CV 01-0515 PA(SHX), 2003 WL
24216269, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2003) (same). But see Takacs v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1117 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (recognizing that the
Williamson “directly covered” language is dictum).
227. Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 195 n.12 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting
in Williamson the Ninth Circuit suggested claims covered by FLSA had to be brought
under FLSA without “deciding” the issue (quoting Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1154)).
Although the cases addressing the preemption of state wage claims “directly covered
by the FLSA,” Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1154, have said so in dictum, the principle and
especially the language “overtime and retaliation disputes,” id., goes to show courts’
willingness to preempt parallel state wage claims. E.g., Anderson, 508 F.3d at 194, 195
n.12.
228. Lopez v. Flight Servs. & Sys., Inc., No. 07-CV-6186 CJS, 2008 WL 203028, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2008) (stating that state claims are preempted when “essentially
duplicative of FLSA claims”).
229. Roble v. Celestica Corp., No. 06-2934 (JRT/FLN), 2006 WL 3858396, at *3
(D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2006) (“Common law claims based on the same facts and
circumstances as an FLSA claim may be preempted under the FLSA.”).
230. Choimbol v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., No. 2:05cv463, 2006 WL 2631791, at *5–6
(E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2006) (“[D]istrict courts examining the issue of preemption have
repeatedly focused on whether the factual basis for claims essentially duplicate or are
equivalent to the plaintiffs’ respective FLSA claims.”).
231. Nimmons v. RBC Ins. Holdings (USA) Inc., No. 6:07-cv-2637, 2007 WL
4571179, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 27, 2007) (stating that “[p]laintiff’s state law claims
related to alleged overtime must be dismissed because they assert rights that are
duplicative of those protected by the FLSA” and that “the FLSA preempts all state law
causes of action premised upon failure to pay overtime”).
232. Morrow v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1253 (M.D.
Ala. 2005) (determining that plaintiffs’ claim that “mirrors the damages available
under the FLSA” may be preempted).
233. Hammond v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 975, 979 (D. Kan.
2004) (“[S]tate law claims that merely seek to enforce the defined remedies of the
FLSA are preempted.” (citing Conner v. Schnuck Mkts, Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1399
(10th Cir. 1997))).
234. E.g., Overnite Transp. Co. v. Tianti, 926 F.2d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating
that every circuit having addressed the issue concluded that “state overtime wage law
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more limited in scope than they appear at first blush because (1) they
often do not independently assess preemption, and (2) they rely on
distinguishable cases featuring facts that save the plaintiffs’ claims
235
Several courts,
from preemption with the FLSA’s savings clause.
especially within the Second Circuit, have determined that “the FLSA
236
does not preempt state wage and hour statutes.” However, none of
the cases looking at state statutory wage preemption recently have
237
actually analyzed the issue. Instead, courts say merely that the issue
is not preempted by the MCA or the FLSA” (citing Agsalud v. Pony Express Courier
Corp., 833 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1987))).
235. See infra notes 236–241 and accompanying text (discussing and discounting
cases where the FLSA has not preempted directly parallel state-law claims).
236. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1417 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding “that section 213(b)(6) does not preempt California from applying the
state’s overtime pay laws to FLSA-exempt seamen working off the California coast”);
Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (explaining that
FLSA’s § 218 “expressly contemplates that workers covered by state law as well as
FLSA shall have any additional benefits provided by the state law—higher minimum
wages; or lower maximum workweek”); Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D.
152, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“It is ‘settled in the Second Circuit that the FLSA does not
preempt state wage and hour laws’ . . . .” (quoting Guzman v. VLM, Inc., No. 07-CV1126 (JG)(RER), 2008 WL 597186, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2008)); Thorpe v. Abbott
Labs., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (stating, “[t]he court in
Neary noted that ‘the FLSA does not preempt state wage and hour statutes’” (quoting
Neary v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 247, 251 (D. Conn. 2007));
Neary, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (noting that “the Second Circuit has explicitly held” the
FLSA does not preempt such state statutes (citing Overnite, 926 F.2d at 222));
Brothers v. Portage Nat’l Bank, No. 3:06-94, 2007 WL 965835, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar.
29, 2007) (stating that because the FLSA “does not preempt state wage and hour
laws” the better course was to examine supplemental jurisdiction (quoting Neary, 472
F. Supp. 2d at 251)); Keeley v. Loomis Fargo & Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520 (D.N.J.
1998), rev’d on other grounds, 183 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 1999) (asserting that “every Circuit
that has considered the issue has held that states may require employers to pay
overtime wages to employees who are subject to the Motor Carrier Act and thus
exempt under . . . the FLSA” (citing Overnite, 926 F.2d at 222)); Cent. Delivery Serv.
v. Burch, 355 F. Supp. 954, 958 (D. Md.), aff’d mem., 486 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1973)
(noting that the principle to apply in a preemption analysis is that “federal
regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state
regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons” (quoting Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963))).
237. See Campbell v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, No. CIV. S-06-2376 LKK/GGH,
2008 WL 3836972, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2008) (stating, “the Ninth Circuit has
held that the FLSA does not preempt state overtime law,” without further analysis of
the issue (citing Pac. Merch., 918 F.2d at 1418)); Gardner v. W. Beef Props., Inc., No.
07-CV-2345, 2008 WL 2446681, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2008) (stating, “[t]he only
doctrine of which this Court is aware that would authorize the reach defendant
attributes to Section 16(b) is preemption, but defendant concedes, in light of settled
Second Circuit authority, that it has no preemption argument to assert on this
motion” (citing Overnite, 926 F.2d at 222)); Damassia, 250 F.R.D. at 162 (stating only
that it is “settled in the Second Circuit that the FLSA does not preempt state wage
and hour laws” without analyzing the issue (quoting Guzman, 2008 WL 597186, at
*10)); Guzman, 2008 WL 597186, at *10 (noting contrary cases but finding “it is
settled in the Second Circuit that the FLSA does not preempt state wage and hour
laws” without further analysis of preemption (citing Overnite, 926 F.2d at 222));
Thorpe, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (stating only that “[t]he court in Neary noted that

556

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:515

is “settled” and cite back to a handful of cases determining that state
238
wage laws are not preempted. The problem, though, is that all of
the precedent upon which these decisions rely involves the
exemption of certain employees from FLSA overtime and minimum
239
wage requirements.
These underlying cases, then, involve states’
ability to allow overtime compensation and minimum wage rates to
240
employees who would otherwise be exempt under the FLSA.
In
other words, they are cases that would provide greater rights to
241
employees, or more generous coverage, than the FLSA would. For
these reasons, none of the cases purportedly rejecting preemption of
state wage laws are instructive because they are all based upon state
laws that are more generous than the FLSA and thus fit within the
savings clause’s scope.
242
For example, in Overnite Transportation Co. v. Tianti, a case cited
in several recent decisions analyzing preemption of state wage claims
243
244
and the interplay between § 216(b) and Rule 23, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit evaluated whether the Motor
245
246
Carrier Act (MCA) or the exemptions for drivers in the FLSA
preempted Connecticut state wage laws that did not provide the same

‘the FLSA does not preempt state wage and hour statutes’” without analyzing
preemption (quoting Neary, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 251)); Brothers, 2007 WL 965835, at *4
(concluding that because the FLSA “does not preempt state wage and hour laws” the
better course was to examine supplemental jurisdiction).
238. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit
precedent on FLSA preemption cases and noting that the court routinely indicates
that the lack of preemption is “well-settled” without further support).
239. See Overnite, 926 F.2d at 221 (involving exemption under FLSA and Motor
Carrier Act but not Connecticut state law); Pac. Merch., 918 F.2d at 1417 (involving
exemption of seamen under FLSA but not California state law); Agsalud, 833 F.2d at
810 (involving exemption under FLSA and Motor Carrier Act but not Hawaii state
law); W.M.A. Transit, 472 F.2d at 1261 (involving exemption under FLSA and Motor
Carrier Act but not District of Columbia law); Keeley, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (involving
exemption under FLSA and Motor Carrier Act but not New Jersey state law); Burch,
355 F. Supp. at 955 (involving exemption under FLSA and Motor Carrier Act but not
Maryland state law).
240. See supra notes 236–239 and accompanying text.
241. E.g., Keeley, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 520 (determining specifically that the savings
clause’s provision “permits state laws to operate even as to workers exempt from
FLSA,” and thus state law provided more generous coverage (quoting W.M.A. Transit,
472 F.2d at 1261)).
242. 926 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1991).
243. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
244. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see Gardner, 2008 WL 2446681 at *2 (citing Overnite, 926
F.2d at 222); Damassia, 250 F.R.D. at 162 (quoting Guzman, 2008 WL 597186, at *10)
(citing Overnite, 926 F.2d at 222)); Guzman, 2008 WL 597186, at *10 (citing Overnite,
926 F.2d at 222); Brothers, 2007 WL 965835, at *4 (citing Overnite, 926 F.2d at 222).
245. 49 U.S.C. §§ 31501–31504 (2000) (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 3101–
3104 (1988)).
246. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (2000).

2009]

FEDERAL TAILS AND STATE PUPPY DOGS

557

247

The Second Circuit in Overnite relied on exemption
exemptions.
cases to determine that “every Circuit that has considered the issue
has reached the same conclusion—state overtime wage law is not
248
preempted by the MCA or the FLSA.” However, because state laws
that do not exempt employees from overtime compensation and
minimum wage payments are more generous than the FLSA, those
249
As a
laws fit within the savings clause and cannot be preempted.
result, these cases cannot be used as support for the proposition that
the FLSA does not preempt any state wage claim. Rather, courts must
250
look to the nature of the state claims involved.
In addition, many courts have determined that state-law claims
outside wage laws, including other statutory and common-law claims,
are also parallel claims for purposes of preemption when they are
duplicative of, depend on the same facts of, or depend on a violation
251
Non-wage state-law claims
of the FLSA in order to trigger relief.
have also been determined preempted to the extent that they have
longer statutes of limitations or provide other remedies beyond what
252
is provided for in the FLSA. As some courts have noted, “the FLSA
247. Overnite, 926 F.2d at 221–22 (noting that to find the FLSA preempted
Connecticut wage law, the court would need to overturn Pettis Moving Co. v. Roberts,
784 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1986)).
248. Id. at 222. A variety of circuits has ruled on this issue. See, e.g., Agsalud v.
Pony Express Courier Corp., 833 F.2d 809, 810 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving exemption
under FLSA and Motor Carrier Act but not Hawaii state law); Williams v. W.M.A.
Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (involving exemption under FLSA
and Motor Carrier Act but not District of Columbia law); Cent. Delivery Serv. v.
Burch, 355 F. Supp. 954, 955 (D. Md.), aff’d mem., 486 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1973)
(involving exemption under FLSA and Motor Carrier Act but not Maryland state
law).
249. E.g., W.M.A. Transit, 472 F.2d at 1261 (stating that the FLSA “expressly
contemplates that workers covered by state law as well as FLSA shall have any
additional benefits provided by the state law” and thus state law provided more
generous coverage).
250. See, e.g., Morrow v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252
(M.D. Ala. 2005) (“Whether Morrow’s breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment
claims can co-exist with her FLSA claims or are preempted by the FLSA depends on
the nature of her state-law claims.”).
251. See supra notes 227, 228, 230 and accompanying text (discussing when
parallel state-law claims are preempted by the FLSA).
252. See Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 192–194 (4th Cir. 2007)
(preempting state-law contract claim with longer limitations period and opportunity
for punitive damages as a result of FLSA’s exclusive definition of remedies);
Nimmons v. RBC Ins. Holdings (USA) Inc., No. 6:07-cv-2637, 2007 WL 4571179, at *2
(D.S.C. Dec. 27, 2007) (determining that “the exclusive remedies available to an
employee to enforce legal rights created by the FLSA are the statutory remedies
provided therein”); Lucht v. Encompass Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 856, 867 (S.D. Iowa
2007) (determining, “[a]ccordingly, a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy is preempted when the public policy asserted is one underlying the Fair
Labor Standards Act, as the FLSA provides a comprehensive remedy”); Choimbol v.
Fairfield Resorts, Inc., No. 2:05cv463, 2006 WL 2631791, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11,
2006) (determining FLSA’s “exclusive remedial scheme” preempted plaintiffs’ state-
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provides an unusually elaborate enforcement scheme,” such that it
“does not explicitly authorize states to create alternative remedies for
254
Other courts have determined that “a clearer
FLSA violations.”
case of implied intent to exclude other alternative remedies by the
255
provision of one would be difficult to conceive.”
Under these terms, courts have determined that the FLSA
preempts claims such as those for indemnity or contribution, breach
256
of contract, fraud, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment.
They have also determined that the FLSA limits the recovery period
under statute of limitations to that set out in the FLSA rather than a
257
longer state period.
CONCLUSION
When examining state-law claims, courts should analyze whether
the claim is parallel to or provides greater coverage than the FLSA. If
the result is the former, the FLSA preempts the state claim and, by
implication, removes the plaintiff-employees’ ability to certify a Rule
23 class on that state claim. In looking at the state-claim issue from a
preemption perspective, courts can save the analysis on the
compatibility of the state-law class with the § 216(b) collective action
for only those claims that are saved from preemption by the FLSA’s
savings clause. This alleviates the burden of examining these issues
and, instead, allows the court to determine preemption on a
law claims that “stem[med] directly from their minimum wage and overtime claims
under the FLSA”).
253. Anderson, 508 F.3d at 192 (quoting Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, 174 F.3d
437, 443 (4th Cir. 1999)).
254. Id. at 193.
255. Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 450 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(citing Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1027, 1028–29 (D. Cal.
1972)).
256. See, e.g., Martin v. Gingerbread House, Inc., 977 F.2d 1405, 1408 (10th Cir.
1992) (determining FLSA preempted indemnity claim); Lopez v. Flight Servs. & Sys.,
Inc., No. 07-CV-6186 CJS, 2008 WL 203028, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2008)
(determining that all plaintiffs’ state-law claims, including fraud, breach of contract,
breach of implied covenants of good faith, tortious interference with contract, and
unjust enrichment, “pertain to Defendants’ alleged failure to pay Plaintiffs in
accordance with the FLSA” and were consequently preempted); Choimbol, 2006 WL
2631791, at *1, *6 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment, conspiracy,
and fraud as preempted because they “stem[med] directly from their minimum wage
and overtime claims under the FLSA” and “merely recast[] the central claim in this
case: violation of the FLSA”). But see Huang v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, 520 F. Supp.
2d 1137, 1139, 1141–42 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (allowing common-law retaliation claim);
Takacs v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1118 (S.D. Cal. 2006)
(allowing California Unfair Competition Law claim that borrows from FLSA).
257. See Anderson, 508 F.3d at 192–93 (noting that evidence of a “willful violation”
will extend FLSA’s two year statute of limitation to three years (citing 29 U.S.C. §
255(a) (2000)).
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prediscovery motion to dismiss rather than after protracted and
expensive discovery. In doing so, courts can both save these
resources and avoid the problems associated with including a parallel
state-law Rule 23 class, including issues with preclusion and
circumvention of Congress’s intent to require an opt-in class.
Let us, in conclusion, look back to the hypothetical Edwards case
for an illustration of how examining preemption on a motion to
dismiss and dismissing preempted state-law claims at the start of
litigation save time and financial resources for all those involved,
including both parties, their attorneys, and the court. Admittedly,
while time invested in a motion to dismiss can be significant, with
successive rounds of briefing, oral argument (if permitted), and the
court’s ruling, it pales in comparison to the time invested in classbased discovery, class-certification motions, and pretrial preparations
for a class action.
Let us assume that three attorneys and two paralegals worked on
ABC’s defense of the Edwards case, while the same number of
individuals (three attorneys and two paralegals) worked on the
258
plaintiff-employees’ case.
Let us also assume that the attorneys
involved have a range of experience, with each side staffed by an
equity partner with more than twenty years’ experience, a junior
partner with eight-ten years’ experience, and a newer associate with
259
one-three years’ experience. According to the Laffey Matrix, the
equity partners’ rates for 2008–2009 would be $465 per hour, the
junior partners’ rates would be $330 per hour, and the associates’
260
rates would be $225 per hour. The paralegals would bill at a rate of
261
$130 per hour. Let us assume that the equity partners each spend
five hours working on the prediscovery dismissal issue, the junior
258. Although many attorneys handling plaintiff’s employment matters do so on a
contingent fee, if the plaintiff obtains a judgment, the FLSA provides for an award of
attorney’s fees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
259. United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, Laffey Matrix,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/Divisions/Civil_Division/Laffey_Matrix_7.html
[hereinafter Laffey Matrix] (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). The Laffey Matrix is prepared
by the Civil Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of
Columbia and provides hourly rates for attorneys of varying experience levels,
paralegals and law clerks. Id. (citing the case that formed the basis for the Matrix,
Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on
other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Numerous courts, especially in the areas
surrounding Washington, D.C., have approved the Laffey Matrix in their analysis of
fee awards in federal employment-law cases. See, e.g., Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of
Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying the Matrix to achieve a rate
reasonably in line with lawyer rates in the Washington area for Washington-based
work done by the plaintiff’s Washington-based attorneys); Does I, II, III v. District of
Columbia, 448 F. Supp. 2d 137, 141 (D.D.C. 2006) (same).
260. Laffey Matrix.
261. Id.
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partners spend 10 hours, the associates spend 40 hours, and the
paralegals spend 5 hours each. At the end of the dismissal
proceeding, whether granted or denied, each party has invested
262
approximately $16,000.
If the case progresses into discovery and the plaintiff-employees
move for state-law class certification, to the extent that one can
apportion time spent on the state-law or class-based issues specifically,
let us assume that the equity partners spend 40 hours, the junior
partners spend 80 hours, the associates spend 320 hours, and the
paralegals each spend 200 hours. By the resolution of the classcertification motion, each party has invested almost an additional
$170,000 that could have been avoided through a successful
preemption analysis.
Therefore, analyzing preemption early in the case and correctly
determining that the FLSA preempts parallel state-law wage claims
not only saves financial and time-related resources, but it also
protects individuals who neither opt in to the collective action nor
opt out of the class action from having their FLSA claims precluded.
This outcome better protects all parties involved and effectuates
Congress’s intent in amending the FLSA to provide for an opt-in-only
collective action.

262. The hours-worked estimate is just an estimate and is not intended to show
anything other than a range of fees that could be invested on certain projects.

